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FIGHTING AGAINST BLACK MONEY BY OFFERING AMNESTY FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH: A STIGMA CAN
NEVER BE A BEAUTY SPOT
S M Solaiman*
ABSTRACT
Black money is a global concern. However, black money has
disproportionately affected Bangladesh. To combat the proliferation of
black money in the country, successive governments of Bangladesh
have offered amnesties to black money holders (BMHs) in
contravention of the national Constitution, legislation, and
international conventions. Nonetheless, responses to such incentives
have been notably poor, mainly because the wrongdoers do not fear
the superficial threat of law enforcement. This article examines the
BMHs’ responses to amnesties so far and explains the substantial harm
caused by such discriminatory favors, including increases in
corruption, the price of real estate, money laundering, deposits by
Bangladeshis in Swiss banks, defaulted bank loans, and capital flights.
To address these problems, this article makes several
recommendations, including discontinuing amnesties, placing checks
and controls on corruption, strengthening watchdog and law
enforcement agencies, incentivizing whistle-blowers and the
establishment of the Ombudsman’s office, and establishing a new
statutory body for the assessment of the performance of financial
regulators. In addition, this article argues that effective measurements
need to be undertaken to increase global cooperation, enhance public
awareness, and stimulate social movement. These recommendations
aim to improve the regulatory regime in Bangladesh in preventing
black money, and they may also be suitable for other countries facing
similar issues.
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INTRODUCTION

Money, by itself, has no color. It derives pigment from the
sources that make it. Within this premise, while there is no universal
definition of “black money,” it generally implies either income earned
legally but hidden from tax authorities or money acquired through
crimes such as bribery, homicide, and terrorism. The most common
offenses are corruption, bribery, abuse of public office, securities
fraud, embezzlement, human trafficking, extortion, and drug
trafficking.1 The United Nations (UN) has set forth 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) for the States to achieve by 2030.2 Goal 16,
in particular, emphasizes reducing corruption and illicit financial
flows, which requires States at all levels to “promote peaceful and
inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions
at all levels.”3
The UN recommends achieving these goals by substantially
reducing corruption and bribery; reducing illicit financial flows;
developing effective, accountable, and transparent institutions;
ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative
decision-making; promoting and enforcing non-discriminatory laws
and policies for sustainable development; strengthening relevant
national institutions; and ensuring equal access to justice for all.4
Accordingly, Bangladesh, a South Asian developing country, has
adopted the SDGs and aims to attain them by 2030. However, the
country’s SDGs trackers—set out by the Government of Bangladesh as
of June 2021—do not show any development or even commitment to
reducing corruption and black money.5 Such silence has led many to
1

Attiya Waris & Laila Abdul Latif, The Effect of Tax Amnesty on Anti-Money
Laundering in Bangladesh 17(2) J. MONEY LAUND. CONTROL 243, 244 (2014).
2
Biswajit Bandyopadhyay, Indian Perspective of Anti-Corruption Institutions for
Combating Corruption in Sustainable Development’ 19(1) DELHI BUS. R. 85, 89
(2018).
3
United Nations, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda (last accessed on June 19, 2021).
4
Id.; Bandyopadhyay, supra note 2, at 89.
5
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, SDG Trackers─Bangladesh’s Development Mirror
https://www.sdg.gov.bd/page/thirty_nine_plus_one_indicator/5#1 (last accessed on
June 19, 2021).
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wonder how Bangladesh will accomplish Goal 16 by the aspired
timeline considering that corruption has not only been a critical
problem since the nation’s independence in 1971, but it has also
contributed to Bangladesh’s developmental stagnation over the years.6
In fact, unfortunately, the levels of corruption in Bangladesh continue
to rise.7
Corruption is a predominant source of illicit money in
Bangladesh that eats away at economic development, impairs social
balance, and smites national attainments. Augustine Nwabuzor, a
scholar on the subject, describes corruption as a conduct that is
“extractive in nature” with far-reaching effects on the global economy,
ultimately warranting interdisciplinary measures to prevent its
spread.8 Within this realm, good governance is an important tool used
to fight against corruption. Following the 1990 restoration of
democracy in Bangladesh, after the ousting of the prolonged autocratic
rule through a mass upsurge,9 better governance was widely expected.
But, due to the lack of political will, the successive governments
frustrated the nation in terms of combating corruption.10 In 2020, the
government of Bangladesh granted a blanket immunity for
“whitening” black money by suggesting to incorporate the money into
the mainstream economy to generate more revenue and create more

6

Nurul Huda Sakib, One Size Does Not Fit All: An Analysis of the Corruption
Preventative Approach of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in Bangladesh,
27(2) ASIAN J. POLITICAL SCI. 211, 211 (2019).
7
Mahbubur Rahman Khan, ACC Guidelines Can Help Prevent Systemic Graft in
Government Offices, DAILY STAR (Bangl.) (Mar. 5, 2021), at Opinion.
8
Augustine Nwabuzor, Corruption and Development: New and Initiatives in
Economic Openness and Strengthened Rule of Law, 59(1) J. BUS. ETHICS 121, 130
(2005).
9
General Hussain Muhammad Ershad came to power through a bloodless coup in
1982 and remained in power until early December 1990 before he was ousted by an
uncontrollable mass uprising. See Habib Zafarullah & Muhammad Yeahia Akhter,
Military Rule, Civilianisation and Electoral Corruption: Pakistan and Bangladesh in
Perspective, 25(1) ASIAN STUD. R. 73 (2001).
10
See Mohammad Mohabbat Khan & Md. Shahriar Islam, Democracy and Good
Governance in Bangladesh: Are They Compatible?, 5(1) MILLENN. ASIA. 23 (2014);
Habib Zafarullah & Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, Corruption and its Control: The Pursuit
of Probity in Bangladesh, CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 59 (Krishna K. Tummala, ed.).
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jobs; the effort failed to present a benefit to nations around the world.11
Impunity has been highly criticized by many of Bangladesh’s leading
economists, legal scholars, business leaders, politicians, the AntiCorruption Commission (ACC) Bangladesh, and the Transparency
International Bangladesh (TIB).12 Flouting all the denunciations, the
government of Bangladesh has yet again incorporated the whitening
opportunity into the Finance Act of 2021, which was legislated on June
20, 2021.13 In fact, ninety-four percent of participants in an online poll
considered this Act to be the legislation of corruption.14 Despite public
sentiment, successive governments in Bangladesh have been
partaking in this practice for decades in violation of the national
constitution, several pieces of domestic legislation, and international
obligations.
Experts cannot pinpoint an exact amount of black money
located in Bangladesh’s informal or underground economy.15 Some
commentators have predicted the amount of black money to be around
37 percent of the gross domestic products (GDP) in Bangladesh,16
while a study of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revealed the
number to be about 33.59 percent of the country’s GDP between the

11

D.S. Sourav, Undisclosed Income Can be Legalized by Paying 10% Tax, DHAKA
TRIBUNE (Bangl.) (May 22, 2021), at Business.
12
See S.M. Solaiman, “Black” Money, “White” Owners, and “Blue” Tenants in the
Bangladesh Housing
Market, 23(2) J. FIN. CRIME 501 (2016).
13
Shakhawat Hossain, Bangladesh JS Passes FY22 Finance Bill with Money
Legalisation Scope, NEW AGE (Bangl.), June 30, 2021, at Bangladesh.
14
The poll was conducted online by the most popular Bengali national daily, Prothom
Alo, published on June 30, 2021, immediately after the passing of the Finance Act
2021 (Bangl.) by the Parliament on June 29, 2021. The question was: “GM Quader
has said that the opportunity to whiten black money is tantamount to legitimizing
corruption—do you think so?” Mr G. M. Kader is the President of the main opposition
party and the Deputy Leader of Opposition in the Parliament. Notably, only 5 percent
responded saying “No,” whilst 1 percent abstained from making any comment:
PROTHOM ALO (Bangl.), June 30, 2021, at 1.
15
The terms “informal economy,” “underground economy,” “hidden economy,”
“shadow economy,” or “unrecorded economy’’ have been used as synonyms for the
illicit economy.
16
Waris & Latif, supra note 1, at 244.
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period of 2004 and 2015.17 Based on an inside analysis of the Finance
Ministry, the then-Finance Minister of Bangladesh in 2013 stated that
the total amount of black money was between 41 and 82 percent of the
nation’s GDP.18 Though amounts differ, it can be said that huge sums
of ill-gotten money are prowling in the country’s underground
economy and are being amassed through crimes and used for
committing further crimes.19 All projected amounts are certainly
alarming. It is a deep-rooted problem in the country, and no
government has ever demonstrated any firm commitment to the
elimination of black money by stringent penalties. Rather, successive
governments have rewarded BMHs with a sort of general amnesty
almost every year, seeking economic development and prevention of
capital flights. People have never accepted that plea for growth;
instead, they are clearly opposed to such amnesties in Bangladesh.20
The past Chairman of the ACC, reflecting on its five-year term ending
in March 2021, admitted that “it is not worth our time denying that
corruption in Bangladesh persists in a wider expanse.”21 Over the past
nine years, irregularities have increased 16 times in four state-owned
17

Leandro Medina & Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economies Around the World:
What Did We Learn Over the Last 20 Years? (Jan. 24, 2018, IMF, WP/18/17),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/01/25/Shadow-Economies-Ar
ound-the-World-What-Did-We-Learn-Over-the-Last-20-Years-45583(last accessed
on July 6, 2021).
18
Asjadul Kibria, White Paper on Black Money, Financial Express (Bangl.), July 11,
2019, at Views. The GDP Of Bangladesh Was US$324.239 Billion in 2020: Aaron
O’Neill, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Bangladesh 2026 (Apr. 21, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/438219/gross-domestic-product-gdp-in-banglades
h/(last accessed on June 21, 2021).
19
Two high profile examples of this criminal conduct are: First, police recovered
BDT20 crore (US$2.410 million) from Lutfozzaman Babar (State Home Minister of
the day) who received this large amount from the owner of a well-known Bashundhara
Group of Industries in exchange for exonerating son (main suspect) of the said owner
from the murder charge of killing a director of the same conglomerate: Z Ahsan, Tk
20 Crore Bashundhara Bribe Recovered from Babar, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), May 31,
2007. Second, Justice Surendra Kumar Sinha, former Chief Justice of Bangladesh, has
been facing prosecution for committing embezzlement and laundering money, while
he worked as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh: Md. Sanaul Islam Tipu, Former Chief
Justice SK Sinha, 10 Others Indicted in Money Laundering, Embezzlement Case,
DHAKA TRIBUNE (Bangl.), August 13, 2020, at Bangladesh.
20
See Solaiman, supra note 12, at 502.
21
Khan, supra note 7.
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banks alone.22 Apart from a few businesses, such as the real estate and
stock market, the whole nation and its civil society, think-tanks, rights
groups, and prominent citizens all overtly oppose this amnesty.23
Nonetheless, amnesty remains commonplace in Bangladesh. As seen
over the past decades, only a small number of BMHs legitimize their
illicit money through these amnesties, while most black money
remains black and is either laundered or spent to enjoy a luxurious
lifestyle. Frequent amnesties stimulate corruption, tax evasion, money
laundering, drug trafficking, and overall fortification of the black
economy.24 For example, a survey conducted by TIB found that 89
percent of people do not get services without paying a bribe.25
Paradoxically, the current government has declared a fight
against corruption on the one hand and offered a whitening
opportunity to BMHs on the other, though these two are mutually
exclusive by nature. Before the enactment of the Finance Act 2021, the
Finance Minister declared unwittingly that “the government would
continue this until the undisclosed money is legalized fully.”26 This is
in contrast to the Finance Minister’s statement that the government has
adopted a policy of “zero tolerance” against corruption.27 It is also
disheartening that the government sometimes recommends the
withdrawal of corruption cases lodged by the ACC; however, it is
encouraging that the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (High Court
Division, hereinafter “HCD”) has reversed such acquittals through
withdrawal and ordered that the case go to trial in December 2020.28
Observers widely believe that the problem of political and
22

Mizan Chowdhury, Forgery in State-Owned Banks in Four Years -31 Thousand
Taka Looted, Jugantor (Bangl.), March 4, 2021, at First page.
23
Ibrahim Hossain Ovi, Explainer: Black Money — What, Why and How, DHAKA
TRIBUNE (Bangl.), June 13, 2020, at Business.
24
Waris & Latif, supra note 1, at 247.
25
Jugantor Report, TIB Survey: 89 Percent People Do Not Get Services without Bribe,
JUGANTOR (Bangl.) September 27, 2019; see also Badiuzzaman Bay, Corruption has
spread over the whole society, DAILY STAR (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.thedailystar.
net/opinion/interviews/news/corruption-has-spread-over-the-whole-society-2008101.
26
B.S.S., Kamal: Black Money Whitening Scheme Will Remain, DHAKA TRIBUNE
(Bangl.), May 19, 2021, at Business.
27
Kibria, supra note 18.
28
M. Moneruzzaman, Graft case withdrawal by govt ‘naked interference’, NEW AGE
(Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.newagebd.net/article/127090/graft-case-withdrawal-bygovt-naked-interference.
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bureaucratic nepotism is closely linked to black money. It unveils the
government’s lack of political will, which is key to reducing
corruption.29 Alongside political will, an effective anti-corruption
movement enables the government to make effective laws and ensure
their enforcement.30 Scholar Douglass C. North underscores the need
for an efficient legal system alongside a conducive institutional
environment for anti-corruption institutions to have the capability to
defuse corruption.31
This article aims to examine the legality, benefits, and
detriments of the past amnesties offered to BMHs and concludes that
such a practice goes against the constitutionally guaranteed equality
before the law, contravenes anti-corruption and anti-money
laundering (AML) laws, encourages proliferation of black money,
stimulates dishonesty, effectively punishes honesty, and reduces tax
revenues eventually harming the national economy and society at
large. This article consists of five sections. Following this introduction
in Section I, Section II analyzes the contraventions of laws and the
State’s international obligations by the amnesties offered to BMHs.
Section III considers BMHs’ responses to the amnesties granted since
the country’s independence and their impacts. Section IV discusses
specific measures that need to be undertaken to prevent proliferation
and exploitation of black money. Finally, Section V summarizes
discussions and makes several recommendations.
I.
AMNESTIES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE NATIONAL
CONSTITUTION , DOMESTIC LEGISLATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
The government has the obligation not to offer such
unconstitutional, discriminatory, unlawful, and unethical amnesties to
BMHs in Bangladesh. First, such amnesties go against the core
provisions of the Constitution of Bangladesh of 1972. For example, the
29

Jon S.T. Quah, Evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies in five Asian
countries: A comparative analysis, 4 ASIAN EDUC. AND DEV. STUDIES 143, 146
(2015).
30
Sakib, supra note 6, at 229.
31
See Douglass C. North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990).
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amnesty is discriminatory in that it allows the BMHs to pay only 10
percent tax to whiten their illicit money, whereas honest taxpayers are
required to pay 25 to 30 percent tax on their legitimate incomes.32 This
discrimination directly contravenes Article 27 of the Constitution,
which affirms that “[a]ll citizens are equal before law and are entitled
to equal protection of law.”33 This is a constitutionally guaranteed
fundamental right of the citizens, which cannot be taken away by any
ordinary legislation like tax or finance laws. As for the legal superiority
of fundamental rights, Article 7(2) of the Constitution declares its
supremacy and pronounces that the “Constitution is . . . the supreme
law of the Republic, and if any other law is inconsistent with this
Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be
void.”34 Consistently, Article 7(1) provides that “[a]ll powers in the
Republic belong to the people, and their exercise on behalf of the
people shall be effected only under, and by the authority of, this
Constitution” (Italics added). “This implies that all law-making
bodies, persons or authorities are proscribed from enacting any law
which is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the Constitution. It is
therefore legally binding for Parliament to make law in compliance
with the constitution.”35 As a further guarantee of fundamental rights,
Article 26(2) unequivocally prevents the State from making any law
repugnant to these rights, providing that “[t]he State shall not make
any law inconsistent with any provisions of this Part, and any law so
made shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.”36 The
provision of discriminatory tax treatment undermines the basic
structure of the Constitution as held by the Supreme Court of India in
Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India37 because loyal taxpayers are being
32

Trading Economics, Bangladesh Personal Income Tax Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS,
https://tradingeconomics.com/bangladesh/personal-income-tax-rate (last accessed on
June 30, 2021).
33
BANGL. CONST. pt. I art.7.
34
BANGL. CONST. pt. I art. 7(2).
35
M. Rafiqul Islam, The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of Bangladesh: A
Constitutional Appraisal, 58 POL. QUARTERLY 312, 326 (1987).
36
The word “Part” within the quotation refers to Part III of the Constitution consisting
of Articles 26–47A.
37
Abhinav Chandrachud, How Legitimate is Non-Arbitrariness? Constitutional
Invalidation in the Light of Mardia Chems v. Union of India, 2 INDIAN J. OF CONST.
L. 179, 180–182 (2008) (noting that the Constitution of Bangladesh has generously
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punished with higher taxes while their disloyal or dishonest
counterparts are being rewarded with the amnesty and may pay a
lower tax rate.
Apart from the fundamental right, the amnesty further
contravenes Article 20(2) of the Constitution, which provides that the
“State shall endeavour to create conditions in which, as a general
principle, persons shall not be able to enjoy unearned incomes[.]”38
Unlike Article 27, Article 20(2) is a fundamental principle of state
policy, which is not directly enforceable under Article 8(2). However,
the highest court of Bangladesh has arguably mandated the indirect
enforceability of these principles. For example, in 1989, the Supreme
Court of Bangladesh (Appellate Division, hereinafter “AD”) in a
leading case, Anwar Hossain v. Bangladesh, pronounced that:
Though the directive principles are not enforceable by
any court, the principles therein laid down are
nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the
country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply
these principles in making laws. It is a protected
Article [Article 8] in our Constitution and the
legislature cannot amend this Article without
referendum. This alone shows that the executive
cannot flout the directive principles. The endeavour of
the Government must be to realise these aims and not
to whittle them down.39
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Kudrat-E-Elahi
Panir v. Bangladesh held that the fundamental principles of Articles 8–
25 have to be applied in making laws.40 Consistently, the Supreme
borrowed from that of India, which is regarded as the established largest democracy
in the world. Accordingly, there are great similarities between the fundamental
principles of state policy, fundamental rights and provisions for their protection as
enshrined in these two constitutions. This justifies the relevance and applicability of
Indian judicial interpretations in understanding the corresponding provisions of the
Constitution of Bangladesh).
38
BANGL. CONST. pt. II art. 20(2).
39
Chowdhury v. Bangladesh, (1989) 18 CLC 1, 61 (Bangl.) (referring to “directive
principles” as the fundamental principles of state policy).
40
Kudrat-E-Elahi Panir v. Bangladesh, (1992) 44 DLR 319, 346 (Bangl.).
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Court (HCD) in Farooque v. Government of Bangladesh pronounced that
the fundamental principles can be applied in interpreting the
fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.41 Moreover, Article
8(2) itself reads: “The principles set out in this Part shall be
fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh, shall be applied by the
State in the making of laws, shall be a guide to the interpretation of the
Constitution and of the other laws of Bangladesh, and shall form the
basis of the work of the State and of its citizens[.]”42 Hence, both the
wording of Article 8(2) and corresponding judicial interpretations of
the fundamental principles of state policy clearly suggest that
amnesties to BMHs violate the Constitution.
When Articles 7, 8, 20, 26 and 27 and pertinent judicial
interpretations are read together, it can be persuasively argued that the
laws offering amnesty to BMHs are unconstitutional, unfairly
discriminatory, and therefore void. To substantiate this view further,
the Supreme Court of India in Musaliar v. Potti held that discrimination
with “an evil eye and unequal hand” is void ab initio in law.43
Furthermore, regarding corruption, the Supreme Court of India in
Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh observed that “[c]orruption
devalues human rights, chokes development . . . and undermines
justice, liberty, equality, [and] fraternity, which are the core values in
our preambular vision.”44
Alongside the Constitution, the legalization of black money
through the granting of amnesties also manifestly contravenes several
pieces of domestic legislation. For example, in providing a detailed
definition of money laundering, s2(v) of the Money Laundering
Prevention Act 2012 (MLPA2012) 45 stipulates that “money
laundering” means:
41

(1996) 48 DLR 438 (Bangl.).
BANGL. CONST. pt. II art. 8(2).
43
Musaliar v. Potti, (1955) AIR 1956 SC 246 (India).
44
Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 64 (India).
45
The Bangladesh Money Laundering Act of 2002 was initially supplanted by the
Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance on April 15, 2008. Subsequently, the
Ordinance was enacted with the title of the Money Laundering Prevention Act of
2009, which was repealed by the Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance of 2012,
followed by the legislation of the Money Laundering Prevention Act of 2012. This
Act has been further revised by the Money Laundering (Amendment) Act of 2015, as
incorporated into the current Act in line with the international initiatives and standards.
42
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(i)
knowingly moving, converting, or transferring
proceeds of crime or property involved in an offence
for the following purposes:
(1)
concealing or disguising the illicit nature,
source, location, ownership or control of the proceeds
of crime; or
(2)
assisting any person involved in the
commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal
consequences of such offence;
(ii)
smuggling money or property earned through
legal or illegal means to a foreign country;
(iii)
knowingly transferring or remitting the
proceeds of crime to a foreign country or remitting or
bringing them into Bangladesh from a foreign country
with the intention of hiding or disguising its illegal
source;
(iv)
concluding or attempting to conclude financial
transactions in such a manner so as to reporting
requirement under this Act may be avoided;
(v)
converting or moving or transferring property
with the intention to instigate or assist for committing
a predicate offence;
(vi)
acquiring, possessing or using any property,
knowing that such property is the proceeds of a
predicate offence;
(vii)
performing such activities so as to the illegal
source of the proceeds of crime may be concealed or
disguised; and
(viii) participating in, associating with, conspiring,
attempting, abetting, instigate [sic] or counsel [sic] to
commit any offences mentioned above.
A close reading of the above definition suggests that it leaves
no room for the granting of amnesties to BMHs. Hence, the thenGovernor of Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of the country,
perfectly noted that “[e]nforcing the Money Laundering Act on one
hand and allowing whitening of black money on the other are quite
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contradictory. As such, it must be stopped.”46 Beyond definition, s4 of
the MLPA2012 makes money laundering an indictable offense, which
can be punished with a jail term of at least four years but not exceeding
12 years and a fine equivalent to twice the value of the property
involved in the offense or BDT 10 lac (US $12,048), whichever is
greater.
The comprehensive definition of money laundering under
s2(v) and the significant punishment thereof imply that the offense is
a criminal one.47 Regardless, money laundering is on the rise, taking
advantage of laxity in oversight, investigation, and enforcement. The
Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2004 (Bangladesh) (ACCA2004)
is another piece of legislation that is starkly flouted by such amnesties.
Affirming this view, Justice Sultan Hossain Khan asserted, while he
was Chairman of the ACC, that “[i]t goes against the spirit of the
constitution of Anti-Corruption Commission. This is selfcontradictory.”48 The provisions of amnesty virtually bury sections 26
and 23, and contradicts section 24 of the ACCA2004.49 This is so
because section 26 empowers the ACC to ask anyone to submit all
necessary statements of their assets, while section 23 entitles the
watchdog to investigate allegations if it chooses.50 Section 24 ensures
independence of the ACC by elucidating that “[s]ubject to the
provisions of this Act, the Commissioners shall be independent in
discharging their duties under this Act.” Hence, the ACC’s
independence can only be restrained by this Act. Nonetheless, the
whitening provisions overtly prevent the ACC from asking any
question to BMHs who take advantage of the opportunity.

46

Rejaul K. Byron, Immunity to Money Whitening May Go, DAILY STAR (Bangl.) Nov.
26, 2004, http://archive.thedailystar.net/2004/11/26/d4112601011.htm.
47
For the definition of a “truly criminal” offense, see He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985)
157 CLR 523 (Austl.).
48
Shamim Ahsan, A Budget Without Direction, STAR WEEKEND MAGAZINE (Jun. 24,
2005), http://archive.thedailystar.net/magazine/2005/06/04/cover.htm.
49
Anti-Corruption Commission Act § 38 (Bangl.).
50
§ 26 provides that the “Commission may, by order in writing, direct that person to
furnish statement of his assets and liabilities including any other information specified
in that order in the manner prescribed by the Commission.”
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Accordingly, section 19AAAA of the Income Tax Ordinance 1984
(Bangladesh)51 as amended in 2020 provides:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force,
no question as to the source of any sum invested in
securities by an individual assessee . . . shall be raised
by any authority if the assessee pays tax at the rate of
ten percent (10%) on such investment within thirty
days from the date of such investment.52
Similar provisions exist in other sectors. For instance, there are
provisions relating to the legalization of undisclosed movable or
immovable property (§ 19AAAAA), investments in buildings or
apartments (§ 19BBBBB), the purchase of bonds under Bangladesh
Infrastructure Finance Fund (§ 19C), and the Economic Zones or HiTech Parks (§ 19DD). All these special tax provisions effectually restrict
the State’s prospects of inquiring further into undisclosed or illicit cash
or other property.
Bangladesh’s core criminal legislation is the Penal Code of 1860
(PC 1860), which was enacted during the British colonial era, and
which continues to apply with some minor modifications. The PC
1860, through sections 162, 163, 165 and 403, criminalizes the corrupt
practices of public servants that detrimentally affects several public
interests. Section 161 prohibits public servants from taking
gratification, other than legal remuneration, and prescribes
punishments, including imprisonment and potential fines.53 Section
51

All sections of the Income Tax Ordinance referred to in this article are as of June
30, 2021.
52
Emphasis added.
53
§ 161 provides: “Whoever, being or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or
obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for
any other person any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive
or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or for bearing
to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person, or
for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the
Government or Legislature, or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with
fine, or with both.”
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162 defines “gratification” as the act of corruptly or illegally
influencing any public servant, the violation of which can be punished
by a maximum of three years of incarceration, a fine, or both.54 Section
163 criminalizes the taking of gratification for personal influence if
done by a public servant.55 A person involved in a legal proceeding
can be found to be in violation of section 165 if he or she obtains
information from a public servant without consideration. Section 403
stipulates that anyone, whether a public servant or not, who
“dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any moveable
property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
All these provisions succinctly criminalize any corrupt or
dishonest receipt of financial gains in any form by a public servant.
Nonetheless, many public servants take illicit property, cash or inkind, with almost complete impunity, and they have been doing this
for a long time. The whitening opportunities also contravene the
Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 (PCA 1947) (Bangladesh), a short
piece of legislation deriving offenses from the aforesaid PC 1860.
Section 3 provides that “[a]n offense punishable under sections 161,
162, 163, 164, 165A or 165-A of the Penal Code shall be deemed to be a
cognizable offense for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure
1898, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained therein.”
54

§ 162 reads as follows: “Whoever accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts
to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification
whatever as a motive or reward for inducing, by corrupt or illegal means, any public
servant to do or to forbear to do any official act, or in the exercise of the official
functions of such public servant to show favour or disfavour to any person, or to render
or attempt to render any service or disservice to any person with the Government or
Legislature, or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both.”
55
§ 163 provides: “Whoever accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to
obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification
whatever, as a motive or reward for inducing, by the exercise of personal influence,
any public servant to do or to forbear to do any official act, or in the exercise of the
official functions of such public servant to show favour or disfavour to any person, or
to render or attempt to render any service or disservice to any person with the
Government or Legislature, or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with
both.”
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Section 2 of the PCA 1947 defines “public servants” broadly by
encompassing public servants defined in section 21 of the PC 1860,
employees of any state-owned enterprises, office bearers of local
government authorities, “a Chairman, Director, Managing Director,
Trustee, Member, Officer or other employee of any corporation, or
other body or organisation constituted or established under any law.”
Hence, the PCA 1947 effectually reinforces the application of the PC
1860 to corrupt activities. Without going into further detail, it can be
noted that in addition to the contraventions of the aforesaid
constitutional and statutory provisions, there are other laws and rules
which are flouted by the amnesty in question. Some of these are the
Government Servants (Conducts) Rules, 1979 (Bangladesh); the
Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1985 (Bangladesh); the
Public Procurement Act 2006 (Bangladesh); and the Public Service Act
2018 (Bangladesh). The transgression against law goes even further.
As mentioned earlier, the amnesties infringe upon
international obligations of the State as well. For example, the
amnesties contravene the United Nations Convention against
Corruption of 2003 (UNCAC) to which Bangladesh has been a party
since February 27, 2007.56 The UNCAC covers five main areas of
corruption that include preventive measures, criminalization and law
enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical
assistance and information exchange.57 The UNCAC requires each
State party to take preventive measures against corruption in both the
public and private sectors and also “to establish criminal and other
offenses to cover a wide range of acts of corruption, if these are not
already crimes under domestic law,” and the States are legally obliged
to establish offenses concerning bribery of national public officials
under Article 15 of the Convention.58 The amnesties at hand blatantly

56

United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41
(188 parties, including Bangladesh, had accepted it by Feb. 27, 2007).
57
Id.
58
Article 15: “Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may
be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The
promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that
the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b)
The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue
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violate these State obligations because they effectively decriminalize
the conduct with special advantages being offered to those who are
potentially offenders although their disputed conduct is required to be
criminalized by this Convention.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR)
is regarded as the “Magna Carta”59 for international human rights law.
Article 7 declares that “[a]ll are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of
this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.”
Although the UDHR is not a legally enforceable instrument, it has
profoundly influenced most of the national constitutions and several
international instruments drafted since its inception in 1948.60
Amongst those international instruments, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR), and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women 1979 (CEDAW) are directly relevant to the present context of
discriminatory tax provisions. Providing a guarantee of equality
before the law, Article 26 of the ICCPR enunciates that “[a]ll persons
are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground[.]” The ICCPR is a
legally binding treaty for the ratifying countries, and Bangladesh
ratified it on September 6, 2000.61 The ICCPR thus applies to the
discriminatory tax provisions.

advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that
the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.”
59
George J. Andreopoulos, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Universal-Declaration-of-HumanRights.
60
Nancy Flowers, A Short History of Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS HERE AND NOW,
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/short-history.htm
(last accessed on June 20, 2021).
61
S. M. Solaiman & Abu Noman Mohammad Atahar Ali, Rampant Food Adulteration
in Bangladesh: Gross Violations of Fundamental Human Rights with Impunity, 14
ASIA–PAC. J. HUM. RIGHTS L., nos. 1–2, 2013, at 29, 47.
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As submitted to the Geneva Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women in 2016, ICESCR and CEDAW bear on
tax discriminatory treatment indirectly as amnesties contribute to the
loss of tax revenue, which “deprives States of the maximum available
resources that could be used to realize substantive equality, respect
and protect all women’s rights, and progressively fulfil their economic,
social and cultural rights, in accordance with their obligations under
CEDAW and ICESCR.”62 Observers add that “[t]ax abuse also has a
more direct impact on the enjoyment of rights, insofar as it exacerbates
inequalities and thereby runs counter to the principles of equality and
non-discrimination.”63 Professor Rehman Sobhan, one of the most
renowned economists of Bangladesh and Chairman of the Center for
Policy Dialogue, a national think tank, comments that “[o]ffering such
whitening facility gives a wrong signal to the taxpayers,”64 and the
“money whitening process will sharply increase economic
discrimination in the country.”65 A former Chairman of the National
Board of Revenue of Bangladesh (NBR) says that the opportunity
discourages honest people to pay taxes as well as weakens the
government’s right to collect taxes, effectively resulting in reduction in
tax revenues.66 Notably, Bangladesh is a party to both of these
international instruments, and it ratified the ICESCR on October 5,
1998 and CEDAW on November, 6 1984.67
Further, the amnesties contravene the international money
laundering control provisions. Articles 6–7 of the UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime 2004 (UNCTOC) stipulate that
every “State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental
principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences” concerning the
62

Alliance Sud, et al, Swiss Responsibility for the Extraterritorial Impacts of Tax
Abuse on Women’s Rights, Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (Nov. 2016), at 9, https://www.cesr.org/sites/default/
files/switzerland_cedaw_submission_2nov2016.pdf.
63
Id.
64
FE Report, Bubble in Market Apprehended as Tk 100b Legalized in Six Months, FIN.
EXPRESS (Bangl.), February 3, 2021, at Economy.
65
Staff Correspondent, Whitening Black Money: Don’t Give the Scope Next Fiscal
Year—Experts Urge Gov’t, DAILY STAR (Bangl.) February 3, 2021, at Back page.
66
Bubble in Market Apprehended as Tk 100b Legalized in Six Months, supra note 64.
67
Solaiman & Abu, supra note 61, at 47.
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laundering of proceeds of crime to combat these crimes, while similar
obligations are imposed on State parties to criminalize and prevent
corruption under Articles 8–9. The whitening opportunities obviously
encourage corruption and facilitate money laundering as alluded to
earlier and will be further argued below. Bangladesh ratified the
UNCTOC on July 13, 2011.68 All these constitutional, statutory, and
international obligations are deliberately avoided and flouted by an
ordinary piece of financial legislation, the Finance Act, almost every
year through amending the income tax law.
It is generally presumed that good intentions underlie all laws
made by State authorities. However, this presumption is rebuttable,
and in a democratic setup, the judiciary is entitled to determine the
validity of any law made by the legislature or executive authorities of
the same jurisdiction. In doing so, a competent court can consider,
among other things, whether the law is “so outrageous in its defiance
of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who
had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at it,” as was
held by the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister
for the Civil Service.69
Likewise, in 1803, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Marbury v. Madison pronounced that “[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”70 Scholar
Anthony Okorodas spells out that “the intention of Parliament can
only be determined by the courts by means of application of principles
and rules of statutory interpretation.”71 And in the context of the
legislative powers of the Parliament of Bangladesh, “[t]he constitution
vests Parliament with the power to make laws for Bangladesh.” This
68

United Nations Treaty Collection, United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mt
dsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&clang=_en (last accessed on June 20, 2021).
69
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374,
410 (Eng.).
70
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803
71
Anthony Ezonfade Okorodas, The Role of Section 2(1) and (4) of the European
Communities Act and Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act in the Interpretation and
Application of Primary Legislation: Impact on Judicial Attitudes to the Traditional
Concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty (Dec. 2008) (PhD thesis, on file with the
University of Northumbria at Newcastle), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/4148919
.pdf.
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law-making power of Parliament is not unfettered but is subject to a
condition of constitutionality. Thus, Parliament is not authorized to
ascertain the constitutionality of its own acts.
The judiciary is entrusted to determine the constitutionality of
an act passed by Parliament.”72 Accordingly, Articles 7 and 102 of the
Constitution jointly empower the Supreme Court of Bangladesh to
review the validity of laws made by the Parliament because “any
competent court of law, especially the Supreme Court of Bangladesh,
is empowered and competent to judge whether a particular act of
Parliament is consistent or not with the constitution.”73 In exercising
this power, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has nullified several
pieces of legislation such as the Indemnity Ordinance of 1975
(Bangladesh), which prohibited the trial of the killers of Bangabandhu
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman74 and others in 1975,75 and the Constitution
(Sixteenth Amendment) Act 2014 (Bangladesh) regarding removal of
judges of the Supreme Court by Parliament.76 Therefore, if a legal
challenge is launched with the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, it is
likely that the Court will declare such amnesties invalid.
II.
RESPONSES OF BLACK MONEY HOLDERS TO GENERAL
AMNESTIES AND THEIR IMPACTS ON THE ECONOMY
A.

Responses of Black Money Holders

Even though only a small amount of black money is legalized,
amnesties can permit BMHs to pay a nominal 10 percent tax, with or
without paying the actual tax in higher rates, while honest taxpayers
must pay up to 30 percent tax for individuals and 40 percent corporate
72

Islam, supra note 35, at 326.
Id. at 327.
74
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Father of the Nation and the first President
of Bangladesh, was assassinated on August 15, 1975, along with most of his family
members and associates. See Sheikh Mujibur Rahman: Army officer hanged for
murder of Bangladesh’s founding president, BBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2020), https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-52258557.
75
Shariar Rashid Khan v. Bangladesh, (1997) 49 DLR (HCD) 133 (Bangl.).
76
Idrisur Rahman v. Syed Shahidur Rahman, (2005) 7 SCOB (AD) (Bangl.); see also
Rezaul Karim, Four could not even be traced, DAILY STAR (Bangl.) Aug. 14, 2016, at
Back Page.
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tax. Responses are inextricably connected with the definition of black
money. There is no uniform definition of black money, and it is
described in different terms by different laws and authorities. As
defined by the NBR, black money refers to that which is earned legally
or illegally but not declared to the relevant government agencies, and
therefore no tax is paid thereon.77 Using “untaxed money” as a
synonym for black money is not only erroneous but also a complete
misrepresentation of its underlying concept as generally perceived.
Commentators are critical of such a simplification of black money,
which arguably waters down the seriousness of its inherent illegality
by minimizing the difference between legally earned money and that
which is criminally amassed through illegitimate means. 78
Commentators prefer reflecting the general perception of such money
in its definition, focusing instead on the ways and means of
accumulating it. This approach encompasses all potential offenses and
morally degraded activities of different groups, including public
servants, public and private organizations, private individuals, labor
leaders, student leaders, and so on.79 From an academic point of view,
a more acceptable perception of such money:
[R]evolves around the concept of illegally obtained
money through political and/or bureaucratic
corruption, bribery at all levels of the government,
semi-government, autonomous or semi-autonomous
offices or organisations, money amassed by the
businessmen through smuggling, black marketing,
shady deals, profiteering, money amassed by labour
leaders, student leaders, through extortions and,
especially, money amassed by functionaries of the
ruling government party and its various organs and
their families, relatives and cronies.80
The government may at times deliberately turn a blind eye to
the fact that black money already exists in the formal economy in
77

Waris & Latif, supra note 1, at 247.
Id.
79
See id.
80
Id.
78
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parallel with the underground economy. This can be easily observed
when looking at the lifestyle and prosperities of BMHs. Expressing a
similar view, some scholars state that such illicit “money circulates
both in the formal economy and the parallel black economy, which
tends to gain strength day by day at the cost of the formal economy,
because black money naturally prefers activities relating to the black
economy.”81Although successive governments since late 1975 have
offered amnesties to BMHs, the public response was clearly
insignificant because the amounts whitened and tax received so far are
both small. Despite the government’s intention of setting deadlines,
there are no punishments for BMHs who have not availed themselves
of the opportunity. This is mainly because BMHs take for granted that
the opportunity will continue for an indefinite period, and so they do
not fear for the threat of punishment.
Consequently, both corruption and money laundering are on
the rise, which is evident in the recent relegation of Bangladesh by the
Transparency International (TI) in its corruption perception index.
According to the 2019–2020 Index report, Bangladesh has fallen to 12th
from the earlier 14th position in the bottom among 180 countries in
2018–2019.82As analysts comment, the larger amount of black money
is siphoned off overseas, the less is saved as fixed deposits, and the rest
is spent on maintaining a rich lifestyle by BMHs.83 Against this
backdrop of abortive regulation of black money, the government
offered unprecedented incentives to BMHs as a budgetary measure for
the 2020–2021 fiscal year. To this effect, the Finance Minister’s
pronouncement was exotically invading and overriding when he
stated in his budget speech:
Regardless of the provisions of any other prevailing
law of the land, individual taxpayers will be allowed
to disclose any type of undisclosed house property
including land, building, flat, and apartment between
81
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Helal Uddin Ahmed, Graft Ranking Goes Down, FINANCIAL EXPRESS (Feb. 3,
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July 1, 2020 and June 30, 2021 on paying tax at a
particular rate on per square metre of the said asset.
Individual taxpayers will also be able to make any
disclosure of undisclosed cash, bank deposits, savings
certificates (Sanchayapatra), shares, bonds or any other
securities between 1st July 2020 and 30th June 2021 on
paying taxes at a rate of 10 percent on the value of the
said declaration; and no authority including the income
tax authority can raise any question on such declarations
[Italics added].84
Despite the complete impunity for legalising black money, the
response was lukewarm.85 The responses of BMHs are shown in the
Table below as reported by the NBR.86

Financial
Year

Black Money
Whitened in
BDT Crore

Black Money
Whitened in
Million US$
(approx.)
US$@BDT83

1971-1975
1976-1980
1981-1990
1991-1996
1997-2000
2001-2007
2007-2009
2009-2013

2.25
50.76
45
150
950
827
1,682
1,805

0.271
6.116
5.422
18.072
114.458
99.639
202.651
217.470

84

Total Tax &
Penalty Taxes
(where
applied)
Received
in BDT Crore
0.19
0.81
4.59
15
141
102
911
230

Total Tax & Penalty
Taxes (where
applied) Received
in Million US$
(approx.)
0.023
0.098
0.533
1.807
16.988
12.289
109.759
27.711

Helal Uddin Ahmed, Whitening Black Money, FINANCIAL EXPRESS (Bangl.), Jan.
13, 2021, at Views (emphasis added).
85
Whitening Money, FINANCIAL EXPRESS (Bangl.), Feb. 5, 2021, at Editorial.
86
Saddam Hossain Imran, Hidik to Show Hidden Money, JUGANTOR (Bangl.), Feb. 7,
2021, at 1; Fazlur Rahman, Scope to Legalize Black Money Indefinitely: Kamal’s Plan
Draws Flak from Economists, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), May 21, 2021, at Business.
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11,107
14,295

30,914

1971-2021
(March)
Total

1,338.193
1,722.289

3,724.581

1,073
1,439

3,916.59

65
129.277
173.373

471.858

Since Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, a total amount of
BDT 30,914 crore (US $3,724,581) has been whitened by paying
approximately BDT 3,916.59 crore (US $471,858,000) to the state coffer.
The triviality of the amount whitened thus far can be compared with
the GDP ratio. The GDP of Bangladesh was US $8.993 billion in 1970,
which grew to US $324.239 billion in 2020.88 As per the country’s
Ministry of Finance, the size of the underground economy is between
41 and 82 percent of its GDP,89 whereas the total amount whitened
over the past 50 years is only approximately US $3.724 billion.
The above Table vividly portrays that BMHs remain largely
unmoved by the frequent or regular declaration of amnesty for them.
This is so because most of them reasonably believe that the cosmetic
threats of punishment for nondisclosure or non-whitening of their
assets will not be enforced, nor do they wait for such an opportunity
to be declared every year, which has already been a repetitive and
routine inclusion in the yearly budget. A brief answer to explain the
poor response regarding such amnesties is that BMHs do not care
about the threat of punishment as they have found no reason to fear.
This assertion was affirmed in fiscal year 2007–2008 when the armybacked non-party caretaker government was able to persuade BMHs
to make disclosures, resulting in the legalization of the highest amount
of ill-gotten money until June 2020, although the offer on that occasion
was more conditional and less attractive compared to previous ones.
87

The opportunity was much wider for FY2020–2021, so this amount (BDT14,295)
includes the prices of the BMHs’ wealth shown in the form of cash, fixed deposit
receipts, saving certificates and shares. Rahman, supra note 86.
88
World Bank, GDP (current US$)—Bangladesh, https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=BD.
89
Kibria, supra note 18; O’Neill, supra note 18.
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The only reason for that historic response was exerting a credible
threat to punish the BMHs after the expiry of the offer period. It is a
matter of great regret that the Prime Minister of the immediate
predecessor of this caretaker government herself whitened BDT 1.33
crore (US $160,240) on August 6, 2007 by paying BDT 33.87 lac (US
$40,807) as a penalty in addition to taxes.90 More reprehensibly, the
immediate past Chief Justice of Bangladesh is currently facing trial for
alleged corruption and money laundering.91 The record of fiscal year
2007–2008 has been broken by the amount whitened in response to the
blanket offer of amnesty for fiscal year 2020–2021, which can be
attributed to two factors. First, the offer made through the Finance Act
of 2020 (Bangladesh)92 is unprecedentedly generous in terms of its
wider scope of investment, and no question could be asked about the
source of money. Second, and perhaps more importantly, both
national and international lockdowns triggered by Covid-19
prevented BMHs from flying overseas with the money. The
government is taking credit in such a success, forgetting these two
extraordinary driving factors. In this regard, Professor Moinul Islam,
a national award recipient economist, prudently explains that money
laundering has also slowed down due to the pandemic, which has led
to a big jump in the display of undisclosed funds in the current
financial year. Once the pandemic is under control, capital smuggling
will start in full swing again.93
Although no one has ever shown any instances of attaining
national economic prosperity by allowing BMHs to whiten their illicit
possessions, the successive governments, in support of these
amnesties, have always accentuated two points: achieving national
economic development and preventing money laundering or capital
flights. These are arguably poor excuses for the hidden, real reason—
the government’s failure in preventing corruption and money
laundering. Whatever the actual reason, the impacts of such
impunities are destructive as these contribute to increasing corruption,
90

Khaleda “Whitened White Money,” DAILY STAR (Bangl.), May 11, 2010; Waris &
Latif, supra note 1, at 248.
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Tipu, supra note 19.
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See the Finance Act of 2020 (Bangl.), §§ 16–19 in particular.
93
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Corruption, BONIK BARTA (Bangl.), June 16, 2021, at Editorial.
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committing serious violent crimes, financing terrorism, punishing
honest taxpayer, declining revenue in the long run, exposing the
country’s shallow securities market to volatility, driving out honest
income earners from the property market, widening the gap between
the rich and the poor, and harming the nation. Discussions of some of
these negative impacts ensue.
B.

Increase in Corruption

There is a unanimous view that defining corruption by use of
a single concept is a difficult task because it is “a complex and
transversal phenomenon.”94 Corruption is defined as the “misuse of
entrusted power or responsibility for any private benefit of self or
others.”95 As articulated by the UN, “[c]orruption is an insidious
plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It
undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of
human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows
organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to
flourish.”96 Corruption has increased ominously in Bangladesh. Critics
blame the government’s flawed policy of indemnifying the money
launderers and heartening them by offering whitening opportunities,
which contributes to increased corruption and serves as a stimulus for
prospective wrongdoers.97
Corruption is sometimes classified into two categories: petty
and grand. The former refers to corrupt practices by low level
government officials, while the latter denotes illegal activities of high
level public servants and politicians committing such acts usually for
larger amounts of money.98 Some scholars explain that grand
corruption occurs at the highest levels of government “often at the
behest or blessings of the powers” and that such treacherous conduct
typically remain unchallenged, and wrongdoers are exonerated from
94

Dulce M. Santana Vega, The Fight against Corruption in Europe: Lights and
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See, e.g., Arvind K. Jain, Corruption: A Review, 15 J. ECON. SURV. 71, 73 (2001).
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potential legal sanctions.99 Grand corruption is particularly pervasive
in that it is committed by high-ranking public officials who regard
themselves above the reach of law, believing that they may freely
engage in corrupt practices.100 This happens in violation of the concept
of the supremacy of law, which is an integral element of the “rule of
law.”101 Corruption is said to be intertwined with the supremacy of
law because those who consider themselves above the law are likely to
disobey it.102 Many scholars thus argue that “[i]t is very difficult for a
nation to maintain the rule of law if its citizens do not respect the
law.”103
Petty corruption, though it typically involves small amounts of
money, has substantial ramifications for the economy and the
public.104 As many as 72 percent of the people in Bangladesh believe
that government corruption is a big problem ultimately halting
economic progress. In March 2021, the past Chairman of the ACC
stated, “it is not worth our time denying that corruption in Bangladesh
persists in a wider expanse.”105 The increase in corruption can be
perhaps best reflected in the TI’s yearly reports of the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) on Bangladesh as cited earlier, which
demonstrates an upward trend in corruption in Bangladesh. The TI
uses a scale of 0 to 100 in determining the scores, meaning that 100 is
the least corrupt and 0 is the most corrupt. Bangladesh’s score in the
2020 CPI released on January 28, 2021, 2020 was significantly worse
than the previous year.106 Further, its standing is deplorable not only
in the global list but also in Asia. Amongst eight South Asian countries,
99
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see Hazel S. Gray, The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania, 114
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Bangladesh is ranked the second-most corrupt country defeating only
war-torn Afghanistan; among all Asian countries, Bangladesh is
ranked the fourth lowest, performing better than only Cambodia,
Afghanistan, and North Korea 107 It is obvious that existing BMHs will
continue to make such money, which will stimulate others to follow
suit, if such a regulatory laxity persists. Instead of threatening to not
extend further amnesty, the incumbent Finance Minister in a prebudget speech declared that the scope to legalize black money will
remain in place indefinitely.108 Such an assurance can only instigate
and inspire accumulation of black money, rather than any legalization
thereof. This is what is happening in practice, which is adding miseries
to the lives of honest taxpayers in different ways. One manifestation of
this harm is the unaffordable housing market in Dhaka.
C.
Driving Out Honest Income Earners from the
Property Market
Housing is a problem in Dhaka because of unreasonably high
prices, widely believed to be driven by black money. Over the past 15
years, the prices of residential apartments located in different areas of
Dhaka are displayed in the Figure below:109
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The average price for land is even more frustrating as
demonstrated by the Figure that follows. 110

These unjustified upward trends in real estate prices
effectively push honest buyers out of the market, which is exclusively
dominated by BMHs. This is evident from the fact that, after the
declaration of an excessively generous amnesty in June 2020, most of
the ready-for-occupants flats in Dhaka had quickly been sold out at a
higher price, and the real estate businesses are now experiencing rising
110
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demands for apartments and flats.111 Around 2,000 flats were sold
between November 2020 to January 2021, and reportedly for which at
least BDT 5,000 crore (US $602.410 million) of black money came to the
housing market.112 Intriguingly, the public servants are the dominant
clients for those houses.113 Given the exorbitant property prices in the
most popular suburbs of the capital city, commentators argue that
honest taxpayers will be compelled to rent from dishonest owners to
survive, which will make the rich even richer at the cost of unfair and
unjust suffering of honest people and their families.114 Money
laundering is giving a further boost to corrupt practices. Expert
scholars argue that a close nexus exists between corruption and money
laundering because proceeds of corrupt activities can be cleaned up
without any stigma of illegality, and laundering is one of the favorite
means of doing it. This connection is termed an “incestuous
relationship” between two evils.115 In quest of the truth in this
construction, the following section depicts the money laundering
scenario in Bangladesh.
D.

Increase in Money Laundering

Money laundering, as defined by GFI, is “the process of
disguising the proceeds of crime and integrating it into the legitimate
financial system.”116 Money laundering denotes a process or a
technique by which launderers clean up their “dirty money”
accumulated from illicit activities to camouflage the origins of the
money with the intention to make them appear to have derived from

111

Jagaran Chakma, Ready Flats Almost Sold Out—Amnesty to Black Money Mainly
Paves the Way, DAILY STAR (Mar. 21, 2021), https://www.thedailystar.net/business/
news/ready-flats-almost-sold-out-2064093.
112
Id.
113
Badrul Alam, Booming Real Estate Business Even During Lockdown─ Most of the
Buyers are Government Employees, Bᴏɴɪᴋ Bᴀʀᴛᴀ, at 1 (June 17, 2021).
114
See Solaiman, supra note 12.
115
Nadim Kyriakos-Saad, Gianluca Esposito & Nadine Schwarz, The Incestuous
Relationship Between Corruption and Money Laundering, 83 Dans Revue
Internationale De Droit Pénal 161, 161-62 (2012).
116
Global Financial Integrity, Money Laundering (May 26, 2021), https://gfintegrity.
org/issue/money-laundering/.

72

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 29

lawful sources.117 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines it
somewhat differently by describing that the commission of money
laundering “requires an underlying, primary, profit-making crime—
such as corruption, drug trafficking, market manipulation, fraud, or
tax evasion—along with the intent to conceal the proceeds of the crime
or to further the criminal enterprise.”118
Money laundering is on the rise in Bangladesh as revealed
from the Basel AML Index 2020, which ranked it 38th among 141
countries,119 recording a worsening move by seven places from its
position in 2019.120 More alarmingly, as disclosed in the annual report
of Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU), the number of
reports on suspicious financial transactions and activities pertaining to
money laundering has risen around 64 percent during the 2017–2018
financial year compared to that of the preceding year.121 The BFIU
annual report records that the total number of suspicious transaction
report (STR) together with the suspicious activity report (SAR) was
3,878 in fiscal year 2017–2018 as opposed to 2,357 reports in fiscal year
2016–2017.122 Correspondingly, Global Financial Integrity (GFI)—a
Washington-based think tank—provides an account of massive
amounts of laundered money of BDT 530,000 crore (US $63.859 billion)
from Bangladesh during 2005–2015, and it estimates that more than
BDT 50,000 crore (US $6.024 billion) is being siphoned off every year
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from the country.123 The Executive Director of TIB comments that a
lack of “political will” is contributing to increasing money
laundering.124 Criminals generally launder the proceeds of crime
because they may have difficulties in using the money in a legitimate
way as they are unable to explain the source of that money. Once such
proceeds are laundered, they become difficult to distinguish between
the legally earned money and that wangled from illegitimate sources,
thus criminals can use the money safely without detection.125
Moreover, the host countries of the laundered money may not ask
about sources at all. However, the main sources of the money
laundered as underlined by the authorities in Bangladesh are
corruption, drug trafficking, and human trafficking.126
Money laundering can be committed by transferring the illicit
money directly or by using trade invoices. Trade-based money
laundering (TBML) is a popular means of committing this offense. The
Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering defines TBML as being “the
process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through
the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their
origins.”127 Misinvoicing is the prime tool used for committing TBML.
The GFI identifies four primary reasons for trade misinvocing: (i)
money laundering as the first and foremost reason for which criminal
and corrupt officials hide their offenses generating the disputed
money; (ii) evading tax and custom duties by underreporting the value
of goods and services underlying the invoice; (iii) claiming tax
incentives from the destination of laundered money as a number of
countries offers lucrative tax benefits to local exporters taking
advantage of which dishonest exporters tend to over-reporting their
exports; and (iv) avoiding capital control as many countries put
restrictions on incoming and outgoing amounts of capital. 128
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Eventually, money laundering with respect to trade
misinvoicing is certainly the falsification of trade documents to
masquerade the punishable truth underlying the transaction, and to
enable the counterpart international trader to ostensibly legitimize the
possession of the property shifted.129 Trade misinvoicing is a useful
means on which launderers rely to commit the primary crime, and
then they deliberately hide the illegality attached to the laundered
property through a series of subsequent transactions.130 Adebayo
Iyanda argues that the motivations of trade misinvoicing should be
considered “predicate offenses to enable prosecutors to bring
additional charges of money laundering against the fraudulent
operations of commercial businesses.” 131 Iyanda adds that money
laundering is illegal because somewhere at the origin, movement or
use of the money underlying a given transaction broke laws.132 The
offense of money laundering is constituted as soon as the true nature
of the transfer of funds from one country to another is concealed and
the assets transferred are proceeds of a crime.133 The true nature of illgotten property obscured in a bid to make it seem licit.134 As
recognised by the European Union (EU), the proceeds can be of any
types of property encompassing:
…that which has been transformed or converted, fully or in
part, into other property, and that which has been intermingled with
property acquired from legitimate sources, up to the assessed value of
the intermingled proceeds. It can also include the income or other
benefits derived from proceeds of crime, or from property into or with
which such proceeds have been transformed, converted or
intermingled.135
The illegal practice of misinvoicing misrepresents the price or
quantity of imports or exports by accumulating money in foreign
jurisdictions to participate in tax evasion, avoid customs duties, and
129
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transfer illicit money.136 This ill-practice is executed by manipulating
the customs invoices or other incoming customs documents, such as
receipts, bills of lading, bills of sale, titles, and export certificates.137
Apart from professional traders, criminals also make use of
misinvoicing to launder the proceeds of their crimes.138 Regardless of
the actual motivation, the process of misinvoicing embroils money
laundering in that illegal activities are disguised by layers of
transactions engineered to make property appear legitimate.139 These
narratives correspond to the traditional theory of a money laundering
scheme, which essentially necessitate the existence of prohibited
profits preceding the perpetration of money laundering.140
In Bangladesh, the description of money laundering provided
in s2(v) of the MLPA 2012 conforms to the definitions elucidated
above. Also, trade misinvoicing is a critical concern in Bangladesh
because 80 percent of the total amount of money laundering is
committed in the manner reminiscent of international trades.141
Bangladesh does have money laundering legislation in place since
2002. Nonetheless, a huge amount of money is siphoned off to foreign
destinations every year mainly because of a lack of enforcement of the
law. The finance minister recently stated that the government will
amend the law to identify money launderers,142 although many of the
known launderers remain untouched.143 The ACC is in operation
alongside AML and anti-corruption laws, but the watchdog has failed
to act fruitfully to meet people’s expectation, as admitted by its
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erstwhile Chairman. The extent of TBML from Bangladesh can be
evidenced by the GFI Report below. 144

A study of GFI titled “Illicit Financial Flows to and from 148
Developing Countries: 2006-2015,” released in January 2019,
uncovered that around US $5.9 billion was laundered from
Bangladesh in 2015 through trade misinvoicing.145 The GFI added that
a total of US $81.74 billion has been laundered over a period of 11 years
starting in 2005.146 These figures confirm an upward trend in such
proscribed transactions when compared with the 2017 report of GFI.147
The foregoing shows the link between corruption and money
laundering in that money laundering increased with the escalation in
corruption. Experts spell out that “corruption embracing collusion,
conflict of interest, and money laundering may remain hidden from
the eyes of the common people who do not perceive or experience its
immediate impact, but their ramifications run through the body-
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politic.”148 Money laundering is directly related to depositing money
in overseas accounts in some instances. Swiss banks are a popular
destination to that end.
E.

Increase in Deposits by Bangladeshis in Swiss Banks

Many Bangladeshis deposit their black money in Swiss banks.
These deposited figures are noteworthy, as demonstrated in the Table
below covering from 2004 to 2019.149

148

Year

Deposited in Crore of BDT

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

365
863
1,106
2,187
952
1,326
2,100
1,355
2,038
3,311
4,539
4,977
5,883
4,288
5,498
5,367
5,203

Deposited in Millions
of US$ (approx.)
US $ @BDT83
US$43.976
US$103.976
US$133.253
US$263.494
US$114.699
US$159.760
US$253.012
US$163.253
US$245.542
US$398.516
US$546.867
US$599.639
US$708.795
US$516.627
US$662.410
US$646.627
US$626.867
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The amounts of money flying from Bangladesh to Swiss banks
recorded in the above Table show mostly an upward trend, and all
figures individually are very large, given the size of the country’s
economy. The amount sent out in 2008 reconfirms that the “fearfactor” works, as evidenced by the highest amount whitened and the
lowest amount, since 2006, deposited in Swiss banks. However, the
amounts deposited in 2020 are slightly low due to the worldwide
pandemic lockdown during which an increased amount was whitened
locally.
The money laundered or deposited in Swiss banks is primarily
generated by offensive conduct, which includes “looting” public
deposits from local banks under the guise of loans by influential
borrowers. A recent US study on the effects of local public corruption
on lending finds that such “corruption exerts a negative and
significant effect on lending in the US.”150 Corruption does reduce
transparency and performance of firms.151 The section that ensues
focuses on the black money accumulated through borrowing from
banks in Bangladesh, leaving several financial institutions in a
critically unsustainable condition owing large amounts of defaulted
loans.
F.

Increase in Defaulted Loans

Capital flights and defaulted loans are inseparably connected
to each other in the context of Bangladesh.152 The current government
deserves much appreciation for notable successes in several sectors,
which have been overshadowed by the manifested failure in the
banking sector. A few people have miserably “looted” almost all stateowned banks in the country. The situation is that money goes out from
banks but does not come back, let alone receiving interests on those
150
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loans. The government has kept those banks running by feeding
stimulus from taxpayers’ money as life-saving injections. The sum of
the defaulted loans in the banking sector has increased by 417 percent
against a 312 percent increase in the amount of credit during 20092019.153 A lawmaker, raising this issue in Parliament, stated that
directors are taking money from banks, laundering millions of BDT,
and also sending money abroad through hundi, which contributes to
the awfully high amounts of defaulted loans.154 TIB blames central
bank failure, political interference, and the influence of businesspeople
on the vulnerability of financial institutions.155 The gradual rise of the
defaulted loans are portrayed below.156

The exponential surge in defaulted loans occurred in
Bangladesh at a time when such loans are decreasing in other Asian
countries, as shown below.157
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Country

Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Indonesia

Rates of
Defaulted Loans
in Percent
11.87
9.3
8.2
3.4
3
2.5

Philippines

2.1

Vietnam

1.9

Country

China
Nepal
Malaysia
Singapore
Japan
South
Korea
Hong
Kong
Taiwan

V. 29

Rates of
Defaulted Loans
in Percent
1.8
1.7
1.5
1.3
1.1
0.7
0.5
0.2

Bad loans continue to escalate further. As per the central bank
data, the total defaulted loans jumped to BDT 95,085 crore (US $11.456
billion) as of March 31, 2021 from BDT 88,283 crore (US $11.035 billion)
as of December 31, 2020.158 Expressing frustration regarding this
increase, Dr AB Mirza Azizul Islam, a high profile economist,
comments that the surge of toxic loans is so high even after
underreporting, and adds that the deterioration can be attributed to
the fact that “the defaulters have been awarded with policy support
one after another . . . When the defaulters are provided with so many
scopes to remain as regular borrowers without making payments, why
would they repay their loans?”159 The executive director of the
country’s Policy Research Institute opined that the reason for such an
increase in the first quarter of 2021 is “the expiry of the regulatory
embargo on downgrading loans in December 2020, however, he also
predicted that such loans are set to increase even further in the coming
months.”160 Almost all critiques point towards the undue incentives
offered to the defaulters, one of which is waiving interests instead of
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confiscating their assets.161 An account of such waivers by eight stateowned commercial and specialized banks shows that they alone have
waived BDT 3,203 crore (US $386 million) over a period of five years
ending in 2016.162 Showing even more generosity to the loan
defaulters, the amount of waived interests was BDT 3,400 crore (US
$409.6 million) for the subsequent two years (2017-2018). 163
A culture of loan defaults has developed over the years mainly
because of government favors for these wrongdoers.164 It can be
reasonably believed that these undue favors have contributed to the
erosion of public confidence in the governance system.165 The
government is so sympathetic to defaulters that the central bank issues
a circular by allowing them to get their credit rescheduled at low
interest rates as well as offering new loans to the defaulters. The
circular was legally challenged, and the Supreme Court of Bangladesh
(HCD)166 halted that the circular to grant new loans to the defaulters
and observed that “giving such privilege to loan defaulters is
tantamount to feeding snakes with milk and banana” and that the
circular creates scope of laundering BDT 100,000 crore (US $12.048
billion).167 The Court further adds that the central bank is
discriminatorily making genuine businesspeople pay 14 to 15 percent
interest.168 Notably, thousands of crores of borrowed money are being
laundered and defaulters are hiding overseas,169 and most of these
defaulters are reported to be laundering borrowed money with the
161
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help of directors appointed on political consideration and top
executives of state-owned banks.170 A former deputy governor of
Bangladesh Bank remarked that “[d]efaulted loans are rising as the
government and the central bank are persistently encouraging
defaulters,” and added that such an encouragement is unprecedented
in the world other than Bangladesh.171 This is happening in a situation
where almost all of the state-owned banks are suffering from
minimum capital shortfalls.172 Banks are supposed to maintain 10
percent capital against their risk weighted assets, and in accordance
with s13(7) of the Bank Company Act 1991 (Bangladesh), such a
shortfall in capital is punishable, though no punitive action has been
noticed thus far.173 Hence, an inference can be plausibly drawn that
corruption and money laundering are contributing to the ruination of
state-owned financial institutions. The black money is also being used
to purchase second homes in other countries.
G.
Increase in Capital Flights and Buying Second Home
Overseas
Many Bangladeshis buy their second homes overseas, but
where does the money for such purchases come from? The NBR
Chairman in 2019 disclosed that less than one-third of potentially
eligible taxpayers pay taxes.174 The immediate past Chairman of the
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ACC termed this “a shame of the nation.”175 Only one percent of
people pay tax, and Bangladesh also lags far behind the neighboring
countries in terms of tax-GDP ratios.176 According to the World Bank,
Nepal has the highest tax-GDP ratio in South Asia at about 19 percent,
followed by Bhutan 16 percent, India 12 percent, Sri Lanka 11.6
percent, Pakistan 11 percent, Afghanistan 9.9 percent and the Maldives
9.1 percent. 177 Unfortunately, the tax-GDP ratio in Bangladesh is only
8 percent which has dropped to 7 percent due to Covid-19, pushing
the country to the situation of 14 years back.178
In such a tax-payment scenario, many Bangladeshis are
paradoxically making their second homes in Asia-Pacific countries.179
Their list includes corrupt government officials, politicians, bankinsurance owners, middle-tier businessmen and construction
contractors.180 Though far behind others in terms of paying taxes,
Bangladesh ranked third amongst all the countries participating in the
“Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H)” project till 2016.181 A total of
4,135 Bangladeshis have taken part in the MM2H project. That number
falls after Chinese and British citizens’ purchase of Malaysian
homes.182 Perhaps more strangely, Bangladeshis have developed a
posh suburb in Toronto, called “Begum Para” (Wives’ Suburb), a place
where the residents are dominantly wives (Begum), and ‘Para’ means
Suburb.183 Wives and children of many Bangladeshi millionaires live
in luxurious houses there, and their husbands stay in Bangladesh for
175
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work until retirement. The expatriate Bangladeshis of Toronto
protested alleged money launderers demanding legal actions against
them.184
As disclosed by the current Foreign Minister of Bangladesh,
based on the government’s secret information, “most of the houses
there have been purchased by government officials.” Some are retired
Bangladeshi government officials, while others are serving officials,
and those officials have surpassed politicians in buying houses
there.185 Incredibly, one of those officials, Prashanta Kumar Halder
alias PK Halder, has misappropriated at least BDT 10,200 crore (US
$10229 billion) from four non-banking financial institutions and has
purchased properties and opened a business in Canada.186
Interestingly, the Finance Minister does not have the list of money
launderers although he recently asked Parliament opposition
lawmakers for it.187 The Supreme Court of Bangladesh (HCD) has
asked for a full list of individuals who have bought homes abroad, but
the ACC failed to provide such list.188 It is widely believed that the
government is reluctant to disclose the identities of such individuals
in anticipation of political repercussion.
The foregoing discussions demonstrate that black money, even
if whitened, goes mostly to unproductive sectors (e.g., housing, a small
amount in share market, money laundering), which does not
contribute to new employment opportunities. Instead, it causes
securities market bubbles, which erode public confidence in the
market and force investors to stay away from the market.189 Therefore,
184
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the government’s claim to justify such amnesties is unfounded.190 The
truth is that black money normally circulates in both the formal
economy and the underground economy,191 which is evident in the
activities of BMHs. One can hardly find economic development by
offering amnesty in favor of BMHs. Rather, such action stimulates both
honest and dishonest people alike to be corrupt. Hence, it is a “very
bad system” as observed by Professor Muinul Islam, a well-known
economist in Bangladesh.192 Consistently, Zahid Hussain, a former
lead economist of the World Bank’s Dhaka office, admits that the
government may be able to collect some revenues and get the amount
invested in the short term by offering whitening opportunities.193 He
however asserts that the continuation of this offer for years will
eventually reduce the revenue by discouraging honest taxpayers, and
therefore he adds that such a practice is “not only unfair to honest
taxpayers but also harmful for tax revenue mobilization and
investment efficiency in the long run.”194
Despite such logical arguments, the Finance Minister has
recently declared that the amnesty will remain in place as long as black
money exits.195 Several leading economists have immediately
lambasted such a blanket immunity and an advance license to both
present and future BMHs, breaking the hearts of honest taxpayers.196
These economists further add that “[w]e have lost at least twice the
amount we have collected” and warned that it will lead to a collapse
of the tax administration.197 Some other businesspersons, economists,
and activists have demanded discontinuation of the facility by arguing
that “it goes against the spirit of tax justice, integrity, fairness and the
constitution,” and further add that “[s]uch an indemnity discourages
honest taxpayers from paying tax while it rewards taxpayers who
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evade tax.”198 Another distinguished economist and a member of the
United Nations Committee for Development Policy, Dr Debapriya
Bhattacharya, said that the whitening opportunities have diluted “the
gravity of offenses that are being committed to evade tax or to have illgotten gains,”199 while a former Chairman of the NBR stipulates that it
debilitates the government’s right to collect taxes from its taxpayers.200
Hence, it is obvious that the indemnity should be
discontinued, and the flow of black money must be controlled in the
interest of the country. The generation of black money can only be
stopped, at least to a large extent, by preventing commission of both
the original crimes creating this money (e.g., corruption) and predicate
crimes committed to utilizing the money (e.g., money laundering).
Although Bangladesh has implemented some initiatives to halt the
spread of black money, such initiatives are many times implemented
unfairly. The discussions that follow explore certain measures that can
be undertaken to effectively address the black money problem in
Bangladesh and abroad.
III.

MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE EXPLOITATION
OF B LACK MONEY
A.

Checking Corruption

A major source of black money is corruption, which is a
‘ubiquitous and deeply rooted’ problem in Bangladesh.201 The extent
of such a problem can be depicted by a recent interaction between a
police officer and a judge’s wife. In this scenario, a police officer went
to the home of one of Bangladesh’s Supreme Court justices to verify
the passports of two of the judge’s daughters. The police officer
requested a bribe of BDT 2000 (US $24.10) from the judge’s wife.
Subsequently, the officer was sued for offensive criminal conduct.202
198
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Studies have shown that at least 65 percent of urban people and 68
percent of rural people have experienced the need to partake in bribery
when seeking services from public authorities.203
Amid the difficulty in separating white and black money,
institutions engaged in the prevention of corruption should be
established, however, Bangladesh lacks the resources to develop such
programs, ultimately resulting in the existence of inexorable black
money.204 Essentially, to control corruption, the government must
require the creation of a strong anti-corruption regime tasked with
protecting society from “this plague.”205 Within this concept, no anticorruption agency will be effective at combatting this evil without the
government’s
good
governance,
openness,
and
overall
transparency.206 In fact, both transparency and openness are believed
to discourage individuals from indulging in corrupt activities.207 More
importantly, transparency and openness can strengthen “appropriate
mechanisms of punishment within the legal, administrative, and
electoral fields.” 208 Above all, the most important requisite needed to
combat corruption is the political will of the government. In a
comparative analysis of five Asian countries, Professor Quah found
that the success of Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
can be attributed to the political will and conducive policies of the
national government.209 Consistently, Mbaku suggested four
requirements to control the spread of corruption: 210 (1) the State
should inhibit public servants from engaging in corrupt activities and
preclude them from working with impunity; (2) the State must have
institutions, such as an independent press, that will act responsibly to
assist enforcement agencies in the gathering of evidence against
unlawful actors; (3) the judiciary must be an be independent and non203
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corrupt body of government; and (4) the State must guarantee its
citizens open and transparent communication to enable the people to
serve as a check on the exercise of goof governance.211 Mbaku adds
that Northern European countries as well as the US and Canada have
followed these four measures in dealing with corruption
successfully.212 His four points are worthy of consideration with
respect to the extent of corruption in Bangladesh in strengthening its
anti-corruption institutions.
B.

Empowering the Anti-Corruption Commission

The ACC is popularly known as the “toothless tiger”213
because of its manifestly limited success in fighting corruption within
the borders of Bangladesh. The ACC was formed in 2004
under the ACCA 2004 to comply with “isomorphic pressure” from
donors; thus, it has created a “mimicry movement.”214 Policymakers in
Bangladesh conceded to donors’ pressure and brought about cosmetic
legal reforms without any genuine commitment to implement them.215
This became evident when the ACC’s independence became limited
through an amendment to the ACCA 2004 in 2013,216 which required
government approval for prosecuting public officials for alleged
corruption. The Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2013 (Bangladesh)
inserted section 32A into the ACCA 2004 requiring the ACC to obtain
prior government “sanction” without which “no Court shall take
cognizance of” corruption cases against those officials.217 The then211
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acting Chairman of the ACC reacted by stating that “[a]n unholy
alliance has been instrumental in making the bill into a law.”218 The
amendment relied upon concepts incorporated into the colonial
legislation of 1898, which is irreconcilable with 21st century rule of law
and inimical to the government’s declaration of ‘zero tolerance against
corruption.”219 Therefore, in the interest of justice, the amendment
should be repealed.
When an evil is deeply rooted, watchdogs must have long
teeth to dig deep because a weak institution cannot succeed at hunting
down corrupt people in an exceedingly corrupt environment. The
culture of impunity and the drive against corruption cannot go
together. As observed by the head of TIB, the ACC does have useful
mandates to prevent and prosecute corruption, however, it needs to
have the adequate capability, skills, and expertise to enhance its
operations; not to mention that its honesty and integrity must be
impeccable.220 The functional weaknesses of the ACC are recognized
widely, except for those whose views are politically or otherwise
influenced. Hence, overhaul is needed to make the watchdog effective
in its statutorily mandated roles.
A scholarly assessment of the ACC, based on empirical data in
a TIB sponsored study, revealed that the watchdog needs to improve
its performance. Its main challenges are winning people’s trust and
confidence as well as overcoming several of its weaknesses.221 The
study found that the ACC enjoys a low level of public confidence and
negative perception on its effectiveness.222 To begin with, all
removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused
of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to
act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence
except with the previous sanction of the Government.”
218
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recruitments for the ACC should be impartial, fair, and transparent.
This will generate greater public confidence in the watchdog.
Woefully, the ACC’s activities are not immune from allegations of
corruption and irregularities, which need to be addressed first.
Individuals who are entrusted with the responsibility to fight against
corruption many times become quickly engulfed by the evil.223
Metaphorically, they must arrive at the job with clean hands. The evil
thorns should be picked up with a needle, however, if the needle itself
is blunt then the thorns cannot be removed. In this regard, a former
ACC senior official in 2016 disclosed the following in an interview:
According to my knowledge, only 2% of people in the
commission are very wicked. You cannot make them
good. And 2–3% of the people are sincere. You could
not make them bad even if you wanted to. The rest of
the people sail in the direction of the wind. Overall if
the people of the top positions are corrupt, then all will
be directed in that direction. Again, if they are decent,
then others will be directed to goodness….224
The ACC’s internal promotions of officials are alleged to be
sold by ignoring merits.225 The regulator has earned the reputation of
being “an ‘indemnity commission’ in recent times because of such
questionable actions,” and there are allegations of government
interference as well.226 The predominant obstacle to its success is
probably the lack of “political will” coming from the government. The
credibility crisis also exists with respect to its operational impartiality.
It is imperative for the ACC to overcome the prevailing public
perception that it is a government body appointed to protect the
government’s political allies and punish its opponents.227 The
watchdog itself has seemingly erected an invisible fence “beyond
which it is unsure, unable, reluctant, or fearful of going, depending on
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the identity, status or linkages of the individuals concerned.”228
Firming this view, the Executive Director of the TIB asserts that the
ACC “must break out of the dividing line it seems to have drawn for
itself which prevents it from going beyond the small fries and bringing
to justice the big fish, irrespective of their identity, status, and political
or other linkages.”229 It is widely believed that the ACC suffers from a
considerable lack of neutrality as it is directly or indirectly influenced
by political interference.230 North underscores the need for an efficient
legal system corresponding to a conducive institutional environment
in which the anti-corruption institutions must have the capability to
defuse corruption.231 To succeed in the fight against corruption, the
ACC must stay above personal, political, and operational impartiality.
232 It requires treating like cases alike without fear, favour, prejudice,
anger, or bias. 233
Addressing the credibility issue is important because holding
a high level of public confidence is critical for a nation’s success. To
this end, an empirical study on the ACC recommended implemented
the following measures: 234 (1) effecting wider publicity of its activities
to reach a greater number of people; (2) publicizing detailed
statements regarding ACC officials’ income, assets, and liabilities on a
regular basis; taking appropriate punitive actions against corrupt
public representatives and high officials; and ensuring effective and
timely investigation and expeditious trial of corruption cases.235 It is
important to note that corruption cannot be combated by corrupt
people. The ACC should therefore compel all its high officials,
including commissioners and their family members, to make wealth
228
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statements; to date, the ACC has never done this.236 The ACC is
empowered to take internal measures against corrupt officials, but
only a very few people have been punished thus far.237 Fairness and
justice must be established first within the regulatory body.
The ACC is a statutory body, and its chairman is appointed by
the President of Bangladesh for five years based on the
recommendation of a Search Committee headed by a senior judge of
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. ACC commissioners, including the
Chairman, can be removed by the Supreme Judicial Council on the
same grounds, and in accordance with the same procedures, as applies
to the removal of judges of the highest court.238 Hence, the
commissions are well protected from any forceful and undue removal.
As assessed by the TIB, the ACC’s legal independence score of 78.57%
was found to be the highest relating to legal independence, mandate,
legal powers and the commissioners’ terms of office and removal
provisions.239 Independence and impartiality are substantially assured
under subsections 3(2)-(3) of the ACCA 2004, and section 24 further
guarantees its operational freedom though it remains financially
dependent on the government under section 25 of the ACCA 2004.
Theoretically, the ACC has no accountability to any authority other
than the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General for reviewing
its financial operations, as stated in section 6(3) of the ACCA2004.240
All this sounds positive in theory, however, in practice, the
independence and impartiality of its operations are not unassailable.
Experts view that its independence is more contingent upon
the personal capacity of office bearers rather than the provisions of law
in the book.241 Also, the appointments of commissioners are conducted
through a fair process even though there have been some allegations
political considerations and lack of transparency.242 Therefore, the
upholding of political loyalties cannot be ruled out given the
selectivity in certain prosecutions as explained with reference to
236
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specific case studies in a research sponsored by the TIB.243 Further, the
ACC has to face bureaucratic procedures and may experience
difficulties in obtaining essential documents and cooperation from
authorities such as banks and the NBR.244 Such a lack of cooperation is
hostile to smooth functioning of the ACC. The ACC’s accountability to
an independent authority must be ensured to facilitate its impartial
operations. To do so, it must overcome its frailty and uphold the spirit
of independence and neutrality.
C.

Introducing Whistle-blower Rewards

Whistleblowing occurs when an employee discloses acts of
wrongdoing committed by his or her colleagues to public authorities;
conventionally, whistleblowing was seen to be an act of personal
choice rather than one of obligation. As articulated by the UN
Coalition, an act of whistleblowing exists when a person reports “on
the illegal or immoral activities of an individual or organization.” 245
Whistle-blowers refer to those persons who, at their own peril, are
“motivated by a sense of personal, and/or public duty, may expose
what they perceive as specific instances of wrongdoing, which may be
within the private and/or public sector.”246
Whistle-blowers often risk being disciplined or dismissed from
their position as they pose a threat to individuals committing
wrongdoings within an organization.247 More importantly,
whistleblowing is regard as “one of the most effective ways of
exposing, fighting and remedying corruption . . . they are essential for
revealing wrongdoing and protecting the public interest.”248 A study
focused on economic crimes revealed that whistle-blowers out
performed professional auditors in detecting frauds on private
243
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corporations as the former were able to detect 43 percent of frauds
while the latter was successful only 19 percent of the time.249
Moreover, it evidences that “whistle-blowers are the single most
effective source of information in detecting financial fraud.”250
Arguing for whistle-blowers, Morehead asserts that whistleblowing is
a “proven effective tool” to help detect wrongdoing earlier with less
harm for the organizations, hence there is little reason not to make use
of it. 251 Dworkin and Schipani reinforce the benefit of using whistleblowers by stating that “[t]he fact remains that encouraging
whistleblowing is an effective tool of transparency which has proven
helpful in the US in fighting financial crime.”252 Pahis underscored the
need for offering incentives to insiders to sharpen anti-corruption
drive in a corruption-prone country.253
This strategy is important because detecting corruption is
generally difficult as the offense is usually committed secretly. It is
generally accepted that whistle-blowers can play a powerful role in
challenging corruption and transnational crimes. The need for whistleblowers has increased in commensurate with the globalization and
technological developments. Within this realm, Avi-Yonah viewed,
“capital is much more mobile than labor” in the era of globalization.254
Globalization has increased integration of markets and the
technological developments have facilitated methods of instantaneous
communications and financial transactions, which apply to both legal
and illegal dealings.255 These transactions are simple to execute but
complex to guard against, resulting in significant weakening in the
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regulatory ability to enforce rules against illegal contracts, which is
evident especially in the cases of tax evasion and money laundering.256
Hence, stimulating the act of whistleblowing becomes a
veritable means of combating corruption.257 Whistleblowing, however,
is a risky task in that the employer may take retaliatory measures
against the whistle-blower for breaching common law duties of trust,
loyalty, and confidence, which may lead to the dismissal of the
whistle-blower from his or her position of employment.258 There are
some common law principles to protect whistle-blowers from
dismissal based on the “public interest theory,” which was developed
out of the “inequity rule” as an exception to the duty of trust, loyalty,
and confidence.259 Vice-Chancellor Wood articulated the theory in
Gartside v. Outram in 1856:
The true doctrine is, that there is no confidence as to
the disclosure of iniquity. You cannot make me a
confident of a crime or a fraud, and be entitled to close
my lips upon any secret which you have the audacity
to disclose to me relating to any fraudulent intention
on your part: such a confidence cannot exist.260
The doctrine is time honoured as the UK Court of Appeal in
Initial Services Ltd v. Putterill consistently held that although an
employee was under a duty not to disclose, information received in
confidence in the course of his employment was subject to exceptions
where the disclosure was justified in the public interest as in the cases
of crime or fraud.261 The Court added, referring to the information
relevant to the case in particular, that “the information was such as in
256
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the public interest was not clothed with the protection afforded by law
to confidence[.]” 262 Lord Denning in Initial Services Ltd v Putterill263
stated that “[t]he exception should extend to crimes, frauds and
misdeeds, both those actually committed as well as those in
contemplation, provided always—and this is essential—that the
disclosure is justified in the public interest.”264 His Honour further
resonated that “no private obligations can dispense with that universal
one which lies on every member of the society to discover every design
which may be formed, contrary to the laws of the society, to destroy
the public welfare.”265
The above information firmly establishes whistle-blowers’
protection in Bangladesh as per the common law.266 Yet this is not to
diminish the importance of ensuring the protection of whistle-blowers
through statutory law. Appreciably, Bangladesh has already done so
in 2011 through the Public Interest Information Disclosure Act of 2011,
popularly known as the Whistleblower Protection Act 2011 (WBPA
2011). However, as reported in late May 2021, most public servants,
right activists, lawyers, and even journalists remain ignorant of the
enactment of such legislation.267 More startlingly, a deputy director of
the ACC), confirmed that they have received allegations of breach of
the WBPA 2011, but they have not lodged any case thereunder.268A
review of the WBPA 2011 suggests that the it is well drafted to protect
whistle-blowers including, amongst others, officials in the public and
private sectors and journalists from all types of civil and criminal
262

Id.
Id.
264
Id. at 148.
265
Id. (quoting Annesley v. Anglesea (1743) 17 State Trials, at 1223-46).
266
For a discussion of different legal families, see Mariana Pargendler, The Rise and
Decline of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 1043 (2012).
267
Zafarullah & Huque, supra note 10, at 67; Raisul Sourav, Reviewing the Views The Legal Protection of Whistleblowers, DAILY STAR (Bangl.) (May 25, 2021, 12:00
AM), https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/the-legal-protection-whistleb
lowers-2098373. See also for lawyers’ ignorance of whistleblowers’ law, BSS,
Whistleblowers’ Act Ineffective Due to Lack of Publicity, DHAKA TRIBUNE (Bangl.)
(Apr. 23, 2018, 7:40 PM), https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/law-rights/201
8/04/23/whistleblowers-act-ineffective-due-lack-publicity.
268
Whistleblowers’ Act Ineffective Due to Lack of Publicity, DHAKA TRIBUNE (Bangl.)
(Apr. 23, 2018, 7:40 PM), https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/law-rights/201
8/04/23/whistleblowers-act-ineffective-due-lack-publicity.
263

2021

FIGHTING AGAINST BLACK MONEY

97

cases, departmental proceedings, or any kind of action, punishment,
discrimination, any measure prejudicial to financial, mental or social
reputation, prohibition of demotion, transfer for harassment, and
forced retirement or discriminatory treatment by employer to an
employee.269 Its section 9(1) imposes significant punishment for any
contravention of the legislation, which may extend to imprisonment
for a minimum term of two years, but not exceeding five years, or with
fine or with both. 270 Further, section 9(2) provides that if the violator
of the WBPA 2011 is a government employee, departmental actions
shall have to be taken in addition to the punishment mentioned in
section 9(1).271 Section 3 contains an overriding provision confirming
that the WBPA 2011 shall apply even if any other existing laws
contradict. 272 Moreover, section 14 provides that if the allegations
brought under the WBPA 2011 are proved on the basis of the
information provided by a whistle-blower, the appropriate authority
may award adequate rewards to him or her. 273
Admittedly, the text of the WBPA 2011 has been carefully
drafted upholding the true spirit of whistle-blowers protection and
combating corruption, but its benefit has never been enjoyed by
anyone though enacted a decade ago. Hence, all that is now needed is
to organize its extensive publicity and strict enforcement. Supporting
whistle-blower cautiousness, Fisher observes that “whistleblowing is
not always unselfish and its revelations are not always accurate. As
with other informants, the whistle-blower’s motives may be selfish or
evil as well, and the information provided may be false or
incomplete.”274 It is not unlikely that some whistle-blowers may act
maliciously to obtain a reward or work towards punishing others.275
For a fruitful whistle-blower regime, an arrangement of concrete

269

Public Interest Information Disclosure (Protection), Act 2011 § 5 (Act No. 6/2011)
(Bangl.).
270
Id. §9(1).
271
Id. §9(2).
272
Id. §3.
273
Id. §14.
274
James Fisher, Ellen Harshman, William Gillespie, Henry Ordower, Leland Ware
& Frederick Yeager, Privatising Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in
the Financial Services Industries, 8(4) J. FINANC. CRIME 305, 310 (2001).
275
For details, see Nyreröd & Spagnolo, supra note 255, at 91-92.

98

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 29

incentives is warranted, as different from the imprecise hope for
reward under the WBPA 2011.
D.

Stipulating Whistle-blower Incentives

An effective whistle-blower incentive regime can be
instrumental to avoid resource-constrained disadvantage of regulators
in obtaining critical information in a cost-effective manner.276 As
explained above, whistleblowing is a risky action for the blowers, their
colleagues, and their employers. Nonetheless, some people agree to
become whistle-blowers to participate in “whistle-blower reward
programs” or “bounty regimes,” which provide financial benefits to
witnesses that provide critical information that may aid in the
conviction of offenders.277 The WBPA 2011 states that providing
awards to whistle-blowers remains entirely at the discretion of
“competent authority.” Not surprisingly, this provision does not
incentivize many people to become whistle-blowers in Bangladesh
where the practice is already not commonplace.
The rewards may be in the form of cash payments or in kind
by protecting whistle-blowers against retaliatory conduct by the
employer. The prevention of retaliation is important as a recent study
finds that 69 percent of whistle-blowers reported to have lost their jobs
or been forced to retire while 64 percent reported to have been
blacklisted by other employers in their respective fields after having
received negative performance evaluations from their previous
employers.278 Cash incentives are not yet common as only the United
States has experimented with such rewards279 even though financial
rewards were first introduced by the False Claims Act of 1863—also
called the “Lincoln Law”—to combat corruption in the procurement
of military supplies.280 Subsequently, in 1867, the Internal Revenue
Services (IRS) pronounced a program of similar rewards with
276
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incentives that were broadened under the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010281 for
information on financial and securities frauds following the financial
crisis triggered in 2007.282 The United States is a pioneer in the area of
whistle-blower laws.283 This is true because American agencies believe
that whistle-blower incentive programs are one of the most powerful
tools to protect the government from fraud.284
Likewise, Canada introduced a whistle-blower reward
program to address financial and securities frauds.285 Along these
lines, tax whistle-blowers have also presented success in the United
States.286 The Tax Court of the U.S. pronounced a rule on August 3,
2016 stating “that tax whistle-blowers were entitled to a reward based
on monies collected in criminal fines and penalties.”287 Some other
countries—the United Kingdom, Hungary, and South Korea—have
also implemented reward programs particularly for antitrust cartels.288
Both South Korea and Canada have adopted laws similar to those in
the United States and have achieved “tremendous success.”289
E.
Current Whistle-blower Reward Laws Around the
World
The National Whistleblower Center, an organization dedicated
to the roles of whistle-blowers, noted that the best laws for such
informers provide “a statutory guarantee” that such risk-takers will
281
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receive a percentage of the pecuniary penalties recovered by
prosecutors based on the disclosures at issue.290A 2021 empirical
research argues in favor of whistle-blower rewards based on a simple
cost-benefit analysis.291 Legislation providing whistle-blower
protections continues to expand globally as evident in the enactment
of such laws in at least 59 countries with varying success.292 The levels
of success vary as many laws are still deficient in supporting effective
whistleblowing, which warrants harmonization of laws by
incorporating all vital features of successful whistleblowing
regimes.293 There are four key critical elements of the most successful
whistle-blower laws. First, legal provisions should allow whistleblowers to remain anonymous and keep their identities confidential
while disclosing information on wrongdoings to the relevant
authorities. This will help protect them from unfair retaliation by their
colleagues or employers.294 Second, a strategy offering both carrot and
stick would work better to prevent irregularities. Carrots will induce
insiders to disclose irregularities despite the well-known legal
sanctions associated with wrongdoing. To this end, public declarations
of financial rewards for whistle-blowers contingent on the successful
outcome of prosecution is critical. 295 Third, whistle-blowers generally
have concerns about reprisals. Thus, remedies should be guaranteed
in anticipation of retaliatory measures. Employers or colleagues often
take reactive punitive actions to discredit or otherwise punish whistleblowers. To discourage these retaliatory actions, the best whistleblower laws provide for a range of remedies: repaying the wages and
benefits lost due to unlawful termination and providing compensatory
damages to cover the time needed to find a new job, including out of
pocket losses, damages for pain and suffering, and litigation
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costs.296 Fourth, whistle-blowers can be given the opportunity to
report through independent reporting channels.297
It is widely accepted that the existence of good whistleblowing
laws leads to increased transparency and market integrity,298 which
are both beneficial for individuals and society at large. Rewarding
those who genuinely blow the whistle is instrumental to the success of
such laws. However, to ensure that we are rewarding the true
contributors, the payment of rewards should be contingent upon the
prosecutorial betting of the credibility of the whistle-blower’s
information, using the information to win the prosecution, and the
decision of the court that the information provided by the whistleblower was important for the successful conviction, which will reduce
falsification by such informers.299
This reinforces the need for an effective whistle-blower
program. However, the program must be well-designed and fit for the
purpose depending on local needs because one-size may not fit all.
Countries, like Bangladesh, wishing to have an effective legal regime
should earnestly consider the necessary features of such laws in
reviewing and drafting their laws, as the preceding discussions
demonstrate. To ascribe certainty to the law about receiving useful
dividends, an amendment to the reward provisions in the WBPA 2011
is in order. Law derives its intrinsic force from its enforcement
potential. Law cannot benefit anyone unless it is voluntarily complied
with, or efficiently enforced, by competent authorities.300 This notion
also applies to black money.301
F.

Strengthening Enforcement of the Law

Law enforcement is critical for the realization of the ends
stated or inherent in a particular law.302 Katharina Pistor found in a
study on transition economies that that the effectiveness of legal
296
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institutions engaged in the enforcement of laws is much more
important than the quality of the law itself.303 In a corruption context,
Henry Carey, an American professor of political science, highly
emphasized the enforcement of law as viable solution.304 The idea of
offering amnesty to BMHs intrinsically emanates from manifested
failure in enforcement of laws. But strict penalty is the solution to the
black money problem, at least in the context of Bangladesh, as proven
over the past five decades. Experts spell out that “[t]he fear factor
might generate far more benefit than what is gained through the
special offer extended from time to time.”305
A non-political but army-backed short-lived caretaker
government was able to whiten the largest amount of illicit money in
the history during fiscal year 2007–2008 until 2020–2021 when the
immediate past prime minister felt compelled to legalize her illicit cash
paying penalty tax in addition to regular taxes. The only reason for
that success was infliction of fear of enforcement of law. In the context
of Bangladesh, experts argue that “the government, instead of offering
a special facility to legalize black money, should go after the holders of
the same. Based on intelligence work, the taxmen need to conduct
raids to locate black money, confiscate it and mete out punishment to
its holders.” 306
A former NBR member recently remarks that the whitening
opportunity provision was needed simply because of poor
enforcement of laws.307 Bangladesh does have legal regime to combat
corruption and other offenses generating black money, though not
flawless, as discussed earlier, but they are invisible in practice, and the
successive governments became violators of those laws by offering
amnesties. The responsible and accountable governance essentially
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entails the strict application of the rule of law.308 Hence, law
enforcement is a greater problem than the words of the law. This is so
mainly because of undue political favoritism, bureaucratic corruption,
and avoidance by the government to grand corruption. Pointing to
enforcement weaknesses, opposition legislators lambasted the
government at the parliament on June 7, 2021 for unabated capital
flights as well as corruption. The deputy leader of opposition at the
Parliament claims that those who are involved in massive financial
irregularities are not facing any hurdle, whereas those who are making
those illicit activities public are facing various problems.309 In
response, the Finance Minister asked the legislators to provide names
of the money launderers, claiming that “he does not know” the names
of such offenders.310 By contrast, the government Financial Intelligence
Unit (BFIU) has found evidence of 1,024 incidents of money
laundering over the last five financial years and they have provided
detailed information on those transactions to the revenant authorities
of the government.311 Some reported offenders have been prosecuted,
but all are without any outcomes thus far. It is commonly believed that
BMHs do not utilize these opportunities to whiten their ill-gotten
assets simply because of a lack of enforcement against those who pay
no heed to the government’s calls.312 TI reports maintain that
corruption is on the rise due to lack of visible punishment, and that
political loyalists remain unharmed.313
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The existence of laws has impact on all people in refraining
from committing wrongs, nevertheless an offense is committed when
one’s resistance is overpowered jointly by high temptation and
favourable environment. Such an environment is stiffened by laxity in
enforcement. Hence, good strict enforcement records can bring home
the law’s desired objects. Referring to Caiden’s research on success in
combating corruption, Gregory states that:
It is hard to take issue with Caiden’s … assertion that
among several key factors explaining the difference
between those countries where corruption is “an
incidental fact of life” and those in which it is “a way of
life” is the “Strict application of the rule of law without
fear or favour by impartial judges” in the former
jurisdictions, which “needs to be enforced throughout
the legal and criminal justice systems from top to
bottom… [emphasis in original].314
Enforcement problems are multifaceted in Bangladesh. As an
antipathetic to the much-disputed whitening opportunity, an expert
Bangladeshi economist comments that “tax administration can’t
monitor properly. Even if it catches a tax-dodger, the case is settled
through a corrupt means. As a result, the government is deprived of
revenue.”315 This claim is evidenced by the information provided by
the NBR itself, while the tax authority discloses that although tax
return has been made compulsory for all tax identification number
(TIN) holders with a few exceptions, most of them evaded filing their
returns.316As per the NBR data, around 54 percent of the country’s
individual TIN holders (2.20 million out of 4.06 million TIN holders)
submitted a return in fiscal year 2019–2020, and showing a slight
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improvement, only 47.5 percent submitted returns in the fiscal year
2020–2021, which constitutes only 1.44 percent of its 167.5 million total
population.317 It is important to note that there were at least 75,563
multimillionaire individuals, and the tax free threshold is only BDT
250,000 (US $3012).318
Amid such a grim picture of individual taxpayers, the record
of corporate tax returns is not pleasing either. As reported in May 2019,
the data of the NBR and the Financial Reporting Council shows that
there are a total of 1,65,500 companies registered with the office of the
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies.319 Of them, 1,11,000 did not submit
tax return, and those returns that were submitted included 33,000 with
“fraudulent audit reports” by forging the signatures of chartered
accountants.320 Another report claims that 12,187 companies have
evaded taxes for a long time through audit report frauds, which have
inflated the financial statements for bank loans and deflated profits to
evade tax, as found by a high-powered taskforce formed by the
NBR.321 The taskforce discovered that 28,187 companies filed income
tax returns in 2019. Of these, 16,000 companies have submitted
“actual” audit reports, while the audit reports of the remaining 12,187
organizations submitted to tax office were “fabricated” to evade
taxes.322
While auditors are obligated to check financial frauds, many of
them have turned to be architects of such deceptions. For example, in
2020, three top auditing firms were held responsible by the country’s
central bank for helping scam-ridden Crescent Group in committing
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multidimensional offenses such as fraud and forgery.323 Although
Crescent Group is facing criminal charges, those audit firms received
only show cause notice and suspension for a small term of 2–3 years
from their specific services, despite their having violated the BankCompany Act of 1991 and the PC1860. 324 Such loose enforcement
cannot generate deterrence. Further, as of November 2021, only 78,000
companies out of 176,400 registered companies have “genuine” TINs,
while the remaining companies have registered with the relevant
office using “fake” TINs. 325 Evidence has been found that these fake
reports were made in collaboration with dishonest income tax
professionals (ITPs) mainly to evade tax.326 The involvement of tax
officials in irregularities has also been found in several internal
investigations, however, they often go unpunished, which is regarded
as one of the major reasons for the poor response of BMHs in
whitening their assets.327 The above-stated facts present an anarchistic
nature of tax evasions, which shall have to be addressed without delay.
The evidence presented above implies the need for
strengthening, amongst other things, tax administration. Typically
there are three facets of tax administration. taxpayer registration,
taxpayer audit, and tax collection. Enhancement of detection of tax
frauds and punishment can be accomplished by improving all these
three aspects.328 Alm and Liu prescribe certain ways of doing this:
[I]ncreasing the number of audits, using more
systematic audit selection methods (e.g., ‘scoring’
323
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methods), improving information sharing across
governmental authorities, increasing penalties for tax
cheating, applying these penalties often and
consistently, publicising tax evasion convictions in the
media as an alternative type of non-financial penalty,
relying more heavily on source-withholding whenever
possible, facilitating payments through the banking
system, granting additional power for collecting
delinquent accounts, and increasing taxpayer
registration and identification via better use of thirdparty information.329
The above-quoted actions represent standard methods for
strengthening enforcement mechanisms and these accord to a
paradigm that considers the taxpayer to be a “potential criminal who
must be deterred from cheating.” 330 Alongside improving tax
administration, other avenues of unlawful conduct and irregularities
shall have to be dealt with a strong determination demonstrating
fairness, firmness, and propriety. It has to be ensured that the
wrongdoers feel the full force of law without any discrimination. The
areas of corruption, frauds, tax evasion, and other irregularities are
publicly known in the country. Most of these wrongdoers include, but
not limited to, public servants, businesses engaged in imports and
exports, money launderers, loan defaulters, politicians, tax
professionals, and accounting professionals. Those whose offenses are
proved should be adequately punished and chastised, and others
should be brought back to the right track to prevent further
irregularities from occurring. This can be achieved by strict and fair
enforcement of respective laws and by amending the laws where
needed, as discussed earlier. The situation will obviously get from bad
to worse, unless punitive measures are taken through enforcement of
laws, regardless of anyone’s personal identity or position, be it official
or political. For this, alongside the existing judicial and administrative
institutions, further authorities may be established to facilitate
expeditious enforcement and watch the watchers, as outlined below.
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Establishing the Office of Ombudsman

An Ombudsman is typically charged with representing public
interests by investigating and addressing complaints of
misadministration or contravention of laws.331 Lin and Hu define
Ombudsmen as being “alternate dispute resolution practitioners that
resolve individual complaints and use the outcomes of those
resolutions to identify and rectify systemic problems.”332 The office of
Ombudsman is used in many countries worldwide in order to ensure
increased transparency and accountability of public administration to
the people.333 Such an office can play a pivotal role to resolve citizens’
complaints against nepotism, misuse of powers, abuse of people’s
rights, and malpractice in the public administration at all levels in
Bangladesh.334 The drafters of the Constitution prophetically
envisioned the necessity of Ombudsman, as evident in its provision of
empowering Parliament to establish the office of Ombudsman
prevalent since its adoption in 1972. Article 77 of the Constitution
reads that “Parliament may, by law, provide for the establishment of
the office of Ombudsman . . . The Ombudsman shall exercise such
powers and perform such functions as Parliament may, by law,
determine, including the power to investigate any action taken by a
Ministry, a public officer or a statutory public authority.”
The Parliament of Bangladesh has explicit powers, and an
implicit responsibility, to create the position of Ombudsman with
extensive powers to investigate corruption and irregularities by public
authorities. Exercising this power, the Parliament enacted the
Ombudsman Act of 1980 (OA 1980) to pave the way to establish an
office of Ombudsman in Bangladesh.335 The purpose of the OA 1980 is
331
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“to provide for the establishment of the office of Ombudsman and to
define his powers and functions.”336 Consistently, it provides that
“[t]here shall be an Ombudsman who shall be appointed by the
President on the recommendation of Parliament . . . Parliament shall
recommend for appointment as Ombudsman a person of known legal
or
administrative
ability
and
conspicuous
integrity.”337
Correspondingly, the Parliament legislated the Tax Ombudsman Act
of 2005 (TOA 2005), and the President appointed Mr Khairuzzaman
Chowdhury as the country’s first ever, and obviously the last to date,
Ombudsman who took office on July 9, 2006338 for a four-year term.339
Notably, it was enacted mainly heeding to the pressure of donor
agencies including the World Bank, which threatened to revoke a
donation of US $200million.340 Regrettably, the government did not
make further appointments to the office.341 Instead, the government
repealed the TOA 2005 by the Tax Ombudsman (Abolition) Act of 2011
with immediate effect from June 22, 2011.
It is conceivable from the creation of such an office
unprecedentedly in Bangladesh that the government realized the
prevalence of massive irregularities in tax offices, although the
government that made the law did not appoint anyone to the
position.342 At the beginning, it was a good initiative, though there
were flaws in the TOA 2005, which could be easily remedied by the
Parliament. Instead, the finance minister of the time (2011) said “I am
astonished at how such an institution had been set up, which does not
have any power. The judgment of the tax ombudsman depends on
Ombudsman Act 1980, see Md. Masud Sarker & Md. Bayezid Alam, Ombudsman for
Good Governance: Bangladesh Perspective 6(1) INT’L J. MGMT. SOC. SCI. 13, 20-21
(2010).
336
Headline of The Ombudsman Act, 1980 (Act No. 15/1980) (Bangl.).
337
Id. §3.
338
Swapan Kumar Bala, Report on Complexities in the Income Tax Laws: A Quest for
a Simpler Taxation System, INT’L BUS. FORUM OF BANGL. (2009), https://ibfb.org/
upload/resource/RFILE20160218054904.pdf (last accessed June 27, 2021).
339
Tax Ombudsman Act, 2005, §5(2) (Act No. 19/2005) (Bangl.).
340
Karim, supra note 333, at 173-174.
341
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342
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BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE, 336 (CCB Foundation, 2006).
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me.”343 Conceivably, the finance minister referred to the provisions in
sections 21 and 25 of the TOA 2005. Section 21(2) stated that if the NBR
is unable to implement the recommendation(s), it will inform the Tax
Ombudsman the reason(s) for non-implementation of the
recommendation(s). The Tax Ombudsman will then bring such cases
to the notice of the finance minister who may (i) direct the NBR to
implement the Tax Ombudsman’s recommendation(s); (ii) request the
Tax Ombudsman to reconsider his recommendation(s); and (iii) take
such actions as he deems fit. Complementing section 21(2), section 25
provided that if the NBR or any person becomes aggrieved by any
recommendation of the Tax Ombudsman, that Board or person may
make an application to the finance minister through the appropriate
authority within 60 days of making the recommendation and he shall
give appropriate order on such application as he deems fit.
The aforesaid reason given by the finance minister of the time
for the TOA 2005’s abolition is unjustified in that if the minister
thought he had excessive authorities over the Tax Ombudsman, the
government could easily amend the law as it enjoyed an absolute
majority in the legislature at that time and to date. Further, one of the
explicit reasons for the abolition was reported to be the Ombudsman
not having “much work to do.”344 This reason was unfounded too, as
the Ombudsman himself disclosed in an interview after finishing his
term, that “as per law he had taken cognisance of 1,000 plus complaints
during his tenure although the number of complaints was a few
thousands. He recommended remedial measures against 700 of them,
and the NBR implemented all of them.”345 So appreciable was the
accomplishment of the sole Ombudsman ever, even though people
were unaware of its existence.346 In relation to the scrapping of the
office, he referred to the recommendation of the Parliamentary
Committee on the Ministry of Finance, which had recommended to
343

Star Business Report, Tax Ombudsman’s Office No More, DAILY STAR (BANGL.)
(July 9, 2010), https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-145974.
344
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citation omitted).
345
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strengthen the office of the Tax Ombudsman, and an online poll
conducted by the nation’s most popular English daily found that 75.4
percent did not support the cabinet decision to abolish the office of Tax
Ombudsman.347 Further research demonstrates that the actual reasons
were contradicted by provisions of the TOA 2005 and a number of taxrelated laws and rules, and that the costs associated the adjudication
process by the Ombudsman were prohibitive.348 The argument that it
was cost prohibitive is untenable in that the government spent a total
of only around BDT 10 crore (US $1.205million) over its four year term,
which presented considerable success in a completely new
environment.349
In sum, the abolition was utterly unfair and unjust. The
establishment of the office of Ombudsman should not be left to the
government’s discretion, but rather must be considered as a
constitutional responsibility as well as a dire necessity. As Robert
Laporte stipulated, both internal and external societies yearn for
national development to call for increased participation, transparency,
accountability, and rule of law globally and especially in
Bangladesh.350 The Ombudsman system is instrumental for good
governance and is being currently used in many countries across the
continents.351 Establishing the office of Ombudsman has become as a
pressing need in Bangladesh, given its appalling corruption records.
Karim suggested immediate reintroduction of such an office with an
independent person as Ombudsman for the protection of fundamental
rights and promotion of social justice and equity of the people in
Bangladesh.352
Going beyond the past, the present article recommends more
than one Ombudsman to expeditiously deal with irregularities in
different sectors, such taxation, banking, essential public services.
Article 77 of the Constitution, as cited earlier, does not limit the
347
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number of offices of Ombudsman; it depends on the parliament, and
having more than one is not unprecedented. This recommendation is
further substantiated below by referring to other countries. A single
state may have more than one office of Ombudsman with the
jurisdiction of specific area of public service, such as Tax Ombudsman,
Financial Ombudsman, Fair Work Ombudsman, Small Business and
Family Enterprise Ombudsman, as currently in place in Australia.353
Given the extent of financial irregularities in many countries and the
corresponding public outcry for justice, financial Ombudsmen are
increasingly becoming an indispensable Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) mechanism which may be established in both public
and private sectors.354 The role of an Ombudsman has gradually
evolved from a reliable safeguard against maladministration to an
ADR practitioner.355
Many countries, both developed and developing alike, such as
Egypt, Sweden, New Zealand, the UK, Canada, Australia, China and
India, have established the office of Ombudsman.356 India is the closest
neighbor of Bangladesh with similar economic and cultural
backgrounds. There is the office of Banking Ombudsman in
India.357 Notably, the administration and financial health of Indian
banks are much better358 than those in Bangladeshi state-owned banks
which have been suffering from capital inadequacy, as noted
previously. In addition, India has enacted the Lokpal and Lokayuktas
353
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Act of 2013, effective from January 16, 2014, which provides for the
establishment of the institution of Lokpal, or Ombudsman, to inquire
into allegations of corruption against certain public offices and
functionaries including Prime Minister, Ministers, members of
Parliament.359 Pakistan, which has the reputation of lack of democratic
governance, has also established the office of Ombudsman.360 The
European Union established the office of the European Ombudsman
by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) giving the authority to deal with
corruption and “cases of maladministration by European Union
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.”361 The European Ombudsmen
“have an essential role when it comes to ensuring transparency in the
functioning of EU institutions, also investigating claims in cases of
maladministration” in connection with abuse of power, refusal to
provide information, or caused by incorrect procedures.362 China,
governed by authoritarian regimes, has also established the office of
Ombudsman with the role of supervision of public offices, with
jurisdiction over executive malpractice and “deficiency in government
departments and non-governmental public bodies.”363 Ombudsmen
can carry out “direct investigations of their own volition” in addition
to acting on the complaints received from various quarters including
members of the public, private companies and government bodies.364
It is appreciable that complaints so received in China are “not filtered
by legislators, and each ombudsman conveys its primary substantive
power through the making of recommendations with no general
power to award remedies.”365
In Australia, the office of Ombudsman exists at both state and
federal levels. The professed roles of the Office of the
359
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Commonwealth Ombudsman are to safeguard the community in its
dealings with the Australian Government and to oversee some of the
private sector organizations.366 The Commonwealth Ombudsman acts
independently and offers free services of investigation and solution to
unfair treatments by the Australian Government with anyone.367 The
office of Ombudsman is regarded as an integrity institution, which
assists with safeguarding people against abuse of official powers,
ensuing compliance with the relevant laws, policies and standards in
Australia.368 The office of Ombudsman confidentially deals with issues
connecting with corruption and proffers significant values of
conciliation, privacy, and problem-solving to the Commonwealth
integrity framework.369 The Ombudsman Act of 1976 in Australia
empowers the office of Ombudsman to compel anyone to produce
information and documents that a person possesses and to interrogate
that person.370
For just and fair operations, Ombudsmen are to be
independent persons who must have both individual and political
independence in order to secure the benefit of such an office. As noted
scholars Nuannuan Lin and Weijun emphasize, Ombudsmen ought to
extend their operational focus from the examination of extra-system
factors to the appraisal of their intra-system issues of concerns, which
will help them discover the root causes of the systemic problems. 371
Lin and Hu further assert that “the unique role that Ombudsman
offices can play in resolving systemic issues by identifying latent
factors that permeate a system and give rise to a recurring pattern of
failures alongside their more traditional role as ADR practitioners
focused on dispute resolution.”372
All this reinforces the justification for having the Office of
Ombudsman in Bangladesh. The Tax Ombudsman and the proposed
366
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offices of Ombudsman for other financial services, if established,
should operate in collaboration with the NBR, ACC and Bangladesh
Bank to minimize, if not to eliminate, financial crime which has been
cancerous and is eating away the country’s expected economic growth,
widening the gap between the “haves” and the “have- nots” and
eroding socio-cultural values.
H.

Promoting International Cooperation

Black money is a global concern, and most of the money is
laundered overseas. The laundering of money is normally a
transnational organized crime involving several jurisdictions with
different legal standards.373 Because of this international dimension of
the offense at issue, international cooperation and coordination are
imperative to effectively address this severe evil which has now
assumed the appearance of pandemic. A 2009 study conducted by the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, showed that the amount
of proceeds of money laundering per annum was equivalent to 2.7
percent of the global GDP, equal to about US$1.6 trillion.374 Gilmore
suggested that three interconnected components of the international
strategy are to be considered for combating money laundering, which
are: (a) establishing preventive measures involving private-sector
actors; (b) strengthening domestic criminal justice systems; and, (c)
increasing levels of international cooperation.375 A successful effort to
reduce this offense requires the law to combat each step of laundering
process, encompassing identification, pursuit, seizure, and
confiscation or forfeiture of the assets laundered.376 Since each of these
steps generally takes place in different jurisdictions, which necessitates
international cooperation to effectively prevent them from happening.
As explained earlier, a huge amount of black money flies to
certain overseas destinations every year from Bangladesh. The
373
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recipient countries may see an ostensible economic benefit for a short
term, but they are harming themselves by allowing this money in the
long run. This is so because the launderers are not ideally law abiding
citizens of the countries where they were born in, they were educated
and skilled at the expense of people’s tax in most cases from primary
to tertiary levels. Whilst they should have a sense of responsibility to
pay back to their motherland as much as possible, they deliberately
ruin the nation in contravention of law for personal gains. The
elimination of this multi-facet problem of black money from any
country, both the source of generation and opportunity of siphoning
off must be obliterated. This eradication calls for cooperation between
the home and host countries of the ill-gotten money. Most popular
foreign destinations of Bangladeshi BMHs are Switzerland, Canada,
Australia and Singapore, all of which are developed economies, and
some of them often preach others about AML control, fairness,
transparency and accountability. They all have strict AML laws in
place for their own nations. Now a crucial question begs to be
answered as to why they entice dishonest people from foreign
countries to fly in with a specific amount of money without verifying
their sources of income. The roles of these countries resemble a double
standard. The problem does not seem to be too complex to overcome
if the international communities show their willpower.
In terms of damaging effects of black money, no state is safe
unless every state is safe. Money laundering is a major way of
digesting black money by BMHs, whilst it is an international crime.377
AML control nonetheless still remains an issue of national concerns. 378
Scholar Maria Bergström describes AML regulation as “a fascinating
field that not only embraces various types of actors and interests,
actions, and processes, but also faces challenges and shortcomings on
a variety of levels and contexts.” 379 Therefore, it warrants international
cooperation, which should be developed and effected through a
convention at the initiative of the UN. Admittedly, to address money
laundering, the UN has already taken some measures, which include
377
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the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,380 the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000,381 the
Political Declaration and Action Plan against Money Laundering of
1988,382 and the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan
against Organized Transnational Crime of 1994.383 In addition, there
are other supportive instruments, such as the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)384 and the Financial Action
Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), an intergovernmental
organization devoted to promoting policies for protecting the global
financial system from the offenses of money laundering and terrorist
financing.385
However, more needs to be done proactively in practice. The
first thing which begs urgent action is a strong commitment by the
international community that no state will allow black money and that
they implement what they have agreed to do through the ratification
of the aforesaid international instruments. All States must adhere to
the core principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, requiring
adherence to legally binding agreements386 and representing “an
elementary and universally agreed principle fundamental to all legal
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systems.”387 It is not hard to scrutinize the validity of funds flown from
overseas by host countries, nor is it difficult to combat the black money
domestically, if the respective governments have the required political
will. An exercise of a due diligence inquiry employing the national
and international agencies should be sufficient to unearth the hidden
sources of black money.
Preventing money laundering requires robust domestic
laws.388 A national law is drafted typically to protect its own interest,
depending on the choice of lawmakers in most cases. Accordingly,
Bangladesh has also enacted AML laws. However, those laws are
likely to have been crafted to keep the interest of legislators
safeguarded, a majority of whom are businesspeople.389 Scholar Selina
Keesoony finds that harmonization of the AML laws is necessary to
create deterrence for actual or potential launderers,390 which can be
achieved through UN initiatives. To combat money laundering
forcefully, the vicious act of laundering “must be recognised as a
tangible threat in its own right,” 391 as “it constitutes a harmful criminal
activity separate from the predicate offences.”392
International cooperation is imperative to combat money
laundering.393 First, all bank secrecy laws should be relaxed,
information of suspicious deposits should be disclosed to the
governmental agencies of the depositors’ home country, and banks
should also ask foreign depositors about the source of the intended
deposits. Amendments to the conservative banking secrecy laws are
argued to be essential to weaken the money laundering opportunities,
387
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“striking a balance between the State’s interest to curb money
laundering and the public interest to uphold bank confidentiality.”394
It can be assured that strengthening AML laws with more teeth will
not cause an end of bank secrecy laws, as these two sets of laws are
mutually inclusive.395 Moreover, discarding the bank secrecy laws
altogether in support of strong AML law is not desirable; instead, a
balance must be struck between the protection of depositors’ interests
and prevention of illicit capital flights.396 This is because weakening
bank secrecy laws in order to strengthen AML rules may cause erosion
of depositors’ confidence in the banking system, which may in turn
weaken or destabilize the economy.397
Switzerland has pioneered the banking secrecy law to confront
an economic downturn. The Swiss bank secrecy law begun in 1934 in
the aftermath of the great recession of the 1930s under the Banking Act
of 1934 (Switzerland), by which the country wanted to safeguard its
ability to hide money within the country regardless of the source of
such funds.398 A breach of this confidentiality was made a criminal
offense of any banker who disclosed the hidden information.399 Since
then other countries started following suit in imposing restrictions on
disclosure of depositors’ information.400 This secrecy is still maintained
by many countries,401 meaning they are facilitating corruption and
financial crimes, although the 1934 situation is now non-existent. It is
a welcome development that Switzerland has started to melt their
rigidity by relaxing the secrecy requirement, thanks to international
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pressure.402 Alongside Switzerland, Canada,403 the U.S., and the UK404
have also been popular destinations for BMHs in Bangladesh,
although they claimed themselves to be examples of fairness,
transparency, and accountability and solicit others to follow them.
Financial crimes at domestic and international levels cannot be
permanently stopped without changing this secrecy law. Money
laundering sometimes involves other serious offenses, such as drug
trafficking and terrorism financing.405 If the bank asks for the source
of money before receiving the money for deposit, it can judge at the
outset whether the money came from a valid source. Even if the
provisions of such a disclosure requirement are simply put in place,
they will still be helpful to some extent. In suspicious and dubious
instances, the bank can make further queries from the potential
depositors’ home country, which in turn can the check the depositors’
tax records of the person and gather other intelligence. This single
measure can reduce the offense of money laundering considerably.
Without going into details of the existing international legal
regime for the prevention of black money flights,406 it can be plausibly
said that the aforementioned international instruments have failed to
achieve the overarching goal of stopping money laundering and
corruption at national and international levels. Although the legal
frameworks exist at both levels, political will is lacking, arguably
because of the host country’s apparent financial benefit. Positive
outcomes cannot be achieved through half-hearted initiatives, but only
through a firm commitment to combating corruption and money
laundering. Any sustainable improvement will remain unattainable,
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unless international communities stand unitedly and firmly against
black money.
I.
Enhancing Public Awareness and Raising Social
Resistance
Corruption is a social disease; hence a social remedy could be
sought to prevent and cure it. Scholar John Mukum Mbaku postulates
that “[i]f citizens can scrutinize the activities of civil servants and
politicians; the latter would find it more difficult to engage in
corruption and other forms of impunity. Such a process would
enhance accountability and minimize corruption.”407 One of the
problems with black money is that BMHs are outwardly admired by
the society they live in, just because of their wealth, yet they are also
despised inwardly by many in the same society, who remain silent out
of fear of retaliation. This is so because money is power, as is generally
perceived. If society could overtly demonstrate its animosity towards
the BMHs, then the wrongdoers would better realize that their actions
for such money are wrong. Public denouncement will certainly be a
useful deterrent, but the question is “who will tie the bell round
the neck of the fat cat”? This is a major concern, because BMHs are
powerful and have the ability to greatly harm others, particularly
those who are honest and quieter than the noisy malefactors.
Wrongdoers are small in number; therefore, they can be overpowered
by social forces if all allies get organized. Younger generations of
affected societies could take the lead locally by boycotting the corrupt
people in all social functions, except for religious ones. The corrupt
people should not be approached for any financial assistance, even for
good causes, such as building mosques or schools.
For a national solution, student leaders should take initiative
and mobilize people across the country to launch a nationwide
movement, though these days, unfortunately, the integrity of many
“powerful” student leaders408 is tainted in Bangladesh by their
407
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pursuits of black money, which is another serious problem in itself.
Thankfully, their number is again small, though they tarnish the image
of larger student communities. Nevertheless, the movement against
corruption can be organized by ordinary students, and social media
platforms can be utilized to mobilize the public initially. Subscribing
to this view, Yingling goes on to say that “[a]lthough civil disobedience
has been traditionally justified as an appeal to majority trumping
considerations, civil disobedience can also be justified as a corrective
measure when democratic processes break down, even when majoritytrumping considerations are absent.”409 This movement should thus
begin by boycotting all known dishonest candidates in elections at all
tiers of governance as a silent protest, before standing firm against
public servants who are subordinate to politicians. Regarding the
modern governance system, some commentators view that members
of a civic community should raise their voice for better public services,
which will inform the public servants of their responsibility for civic
duties.410 Likewise, leading voice for human rights Amartya Sen
commented that the engagement of citizens of a country energizes
people with the opportunity and motivation to raise their voice against
injustice and discrimination, and it also promotes human capabilities,
uplifts fundamental freedoms, and overall makes contribution to
improve well-being and quality of life of the people.411 In the present
context of Bangladesh, Sakib preaches that the movement against
corruption in Bangladesh can be effectively carried out through
rallying citizens at the grass-roots level.412 He adds that “spontaneous
participation from youth groups in raising awareness about
corruption will provide more significant outcomes in society than
waiting for isomorphic approaches to preventing corruption to
work.”413
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A recent successful event of social movements and mass street
gatherings in Bangladesh took place in 2013, called the “Shahbag
Movement” (referencing a famous street square in the capital city near
the University of Dhaka), which concerned the national trial of a top
war criminal in Bangladesh. The protesters mobilized around half a
million of people overnight to advocate for increasing the war
criminal’s sentence from life imprisonment to capital punishment,
which effectively compelled the government to amend the law almost
instantaneously by enacting a provision allowing for raising the level
of punishment on appeal.414 Accordingly, the war criminal was
awarded the death sentence, which could not have been done without
the unprecedented mass agitation not seen since Bangladesh
independence in 1971.415 The “Occupy Wall Street” movement is
another recent international example of an apolitical social
demonstration.416 Therefore, students must first commit themselves to
stop receiving black money and sincerely regard corruption to be an
odiously wrongful act to be avoided at their work and in social
engagements. This will provide them with a moral boost to get
organized against black money and help them to launch a conscious,
sensible, disciplined, peaceful and constructive movement across the
country against the evil. Any type of violent movement must be
avoided to demonstrate full compliance with the law of the land.
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J.
Establishing a New Authority for Coordination and
Performance Assessment of Financial Regulators
Bangladesh Bank, NBR, ACC, and the Bangladesh Securities
and Exchange Commission (BSEC)417 are the four major bodies
engaged in the regulation of financial issues in Bangladesh, while the
Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU) provides intelligence
reports. The BSEC is directly relevant because of black money
investment in the market. An empirical study conducted in China
argues that anti-corruption initiatives require multifaceted
considerations that necessitate the regulatory mechanism to go beyond
straight control measures directly against corrupt practices.418
Regulatory bodies need to be creative in their actions from different
angles, such as the acts of generation, places of preservation, heads of
consumption, and ways of exportation of black money. Different
bodies are tasked with the responsibilities of overseeing or controlling
different aspects of the proceeds of corruption and other crimes.
Financial issues are generally complex, which warrant a coordinated
effort to make the regulation a success, and the accountability of each
regulator must maximize regulatory fruition. Effective interactions
between these regulators are necessary for accountability mechanisms
to produce better anti-corruption outcomes.419
Putting in place an assessment body to hold different
regulators accountable for their performance in the financial sector
was recommended in Australia by the latest Financial Services Royal
Commission, headed by the Commissioner, the Honourable Kenneth
Madison Hayne AC QC, in its final report submitted in February
2019.420 The Royal Commission discovered massive irregularities by
some financial institutions.421 In pursuance of the Royal Commission’s
417
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recommendation 6.14, the Federal Parliament of Australia has enacted
the Financial Regulator Assessment Authority Act 2021 (Australia) in
June 2021422 to establish a new authority named the Financial
Regulator Assessment Authority (FRAA), a body tasked with
assessing the effectiveness and capability of Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC)423 and Australian Prudential
Regulatory Authority (APRA)424 in discharging their respective
statutory functions and meeting their statutory objects.425 FRAA will
consist of four members, including a Chair, to be appointed by a
Treasury portfolio minister, and two others appointed members,
whilst a fourth member is the departmental member, who will be the
Secretary of the Department of the Treasury or a nominated Senior
Executive Service (SES) employee.426 Both APRA and ASIC will be
subject to capability reviews at least once every two financial years by
FRAA.427 The FRAA will be tasked with complementing and
expanding on the existing accountability mechanisms, which is
currently applicable to ASIC and APRA. The FRAA will not review
individual enforcement cases, rather it will provide systemic scrutiny
over the enforcement by ASIC and APRA.428 The object of the
legislation is to provide for the independent assessment of the
effectiveness of ASIC and APRA.429 The key functions and powers of
the FRAA include: (i) conducting biennial assessment of the
effectiveness of ASIC and APRA and reporting to the Minister on their
effectiveness;430 (ii) the Minister can request FRAA to undertake
capability reviews of either or both of ASIC and APRA and report to
the Minister;431 and (iii) the FRAA can undertake an assessment itself
422
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or in response to the Minister’s request on an ad hoc basis and report
to the Minister on the effectiveness of both or either ASIC and
APRA.432 Bangladesh should establish such an authority to coordinate
and assess conduct of NBR, ACC, Bangladesh Bank, and Bangladesh
Securities Commission for better outcomes of the financial regulatory
systems.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Crimes are created by law criminalizing certain conduct for
restoring and maintaining order in the society. Amnesties to deliberate
transgressors of the law generate people’s disregard for the legal
system and erode public confidence in the whole governance system.
This is what has happened in Bangladesh in relation to the profusion
of black money, the control of which is of paramount importance to
establish fairness and justice and to achieve Goal 16 of the SDGs. Law
must be allowed to take its own course, and a crime should be
punished in accordance with the spirit of the law which was in place
at the time of its commission. Any failure in doing so or turning a blind
eye to such offenses would be the failure of the State in enforcing the
law, whilst offering amnesties in question amounts to not only
breaking the law by its makers themselves through exculpating the
offenders, but also effectively inciting them to commit further crime.
Such dereliction of state duty would impair the rule of law and
contribute to an irreparable ailment of lawlessness in the relevant
areas, as is evident currently in the dominance of black money. After
all, the mice will play when the cat is away. Corruption is such an
influential factor that it prompts proponents of the free-market
economy to rely more on the market itself, and because of the
incompetence and corruption of government regulators, asserting
“public interest” regulation would actually worsen the market
malfeasances instead of helping to improve the situation.433
This article focuses on the illegality of amnesties offered to
BMHs in Bangladesh and analyzes their harmful impacts on the
economy, crimes, and honest taxpayers. The illegality has been shown
through the violations of specific provisions of the Constitution, the
432
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MLPA2012, the ACCA2004, the PC1860, and the PCA1947.434 Besides,
these amnesties also contravene certain provisions of the UNCAC,
ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW and UNCTOC.435 In investigating responses
to, and impacts of, the amnesties in question, this article finds that the
overall response of BMHs to these offers from 1971 to 2021 is
frustrating because the wrongdoers do not care about the undue
incentives, This is mainly because of a lack of fright, meaning the
government has failed to inflict any reasonable amount of fear to
persuade them to respond. Most of the black money is already in the
market, and a huge amount of it is laundered overseas every year.
Although no appreciable benefits have been found, there are several
specific detrimental effects of such amnesties, as demonstrated in this
article. These include a significant increase in: (a) corruption; (b) price
of real estate (driving out honest taxpayers from the market); (c)
money laundering; (d) deposits by Bangladeshis in Swiss banks; (e)
defaulted bank loans causing minimum capital shortfalls to most of
the state-owned banks which have been kept running by the
government paid taxpayer money as stimuli; and (f) capital flights
from Bangladesh—many of these BMHs have bought their second
homes overseas.
Upon the above disheartening findings, this article seeks to
work out the ways of punishing the dishonest, protecting the honest,
preventing the proliferation and exploitation of black money, and
overall, bringing the ill-gotten assets under control for the benefit of
the nation. Particular measures that this article solicits to consider are
precisely mentioned below. First, corruption must be checked strictly,
and the amnesty should be discontinued immediately. The failed
whitening provisions must be removed from the Income Tax
Ordinance of 1984, and no further inclusion of those unfair and
discriminatory provisions in violation laws should be contemplated.
Second, the ACC needs to be enabled to reach out all corrupt people
without any “no go area.” To do so, the ACC must be independent
both personally and institutionally. Its internal corruption has
434
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damaged its image, will continue to do so, and will ultimately result
in complete erosion of public confidence in the commission, unless the
dishonesty is eliminated from it. Third, insiders should be incentivized
by offering statutorily specified worthwhile rewards and be
guaranteed protection from all ex-post adversities in advance by
legislation. Fourth, only a credible threat of enforcement of law can
instill fear of punishment into wrongdoers. The enforcement of law is
visibly weak, and consequently, wrongdoers take advantage. The
current laxity in enforcement should be replaced with inevitability
ensuring utmost neutrality. Fifth, establishing the office of
Ombudsman as mandated by the Constitution is long overdue. The
country’s sole office of Ombudsman, Tax Ombudsman, has been
unduly abolished just after the expiry of the initial four-year tenure of
the first Ombudsman in 2010. The office of Tax Ombudsman must be
restored, and two more should be established: one for the country’s
fragile banking sector, and the other for corruption in other sectors.
Sixth, black money has been a global concern, hence, no country can
perfectly control this money alone without useful cooperation from
international communities. This article identifies the existing
international framework pertinent to black money and finds that,
while it works in theory, its fruits can be reaped only through
extending cooperation in practice. To this end, the UN needs to take
further initiatives to maximize global cooperation collectively against
this evil. Seventh, public awareness and corresponding movement are
critical. Article 7(1) of the Constitution pronounces that “[a]ll powers
in the Republic belong to the people.”436 People can exercise this power
lawfully in electing their representatives and peacefully protesting
corrupt activities by anyone. Boycotting BMHs socially would also be
useful, though not sufficient. This study recommends enhancing
public awareness of the persistent abundance of black money and
stimulating them to unite both locally and nationally, under the
leadership of honest students, against generation and exploitation of
black money. Finally, it recommends that a new authority for
coordination and performance assessment of major financial
regulators, including the ACC, the NBR, Bangladesh Bank, and the
BSEC, be formed as a statutory body corporate, in conformity with the
436
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new body in Australia, the FRAA.437 The proposed body can be called
the “Bangladesh Financial Regulator Assessment Authority,” and its
composition, powers, and functions can be defined in line with those
of the FRAA from the Financial Regulator Assessment Authority Act
of 2021 (Australia).
Culpability of humans cannot be entirely eradicated from any
society forever. However, it can be minimized by law when the words
of law correspond to the need of a given society, and enforcement
thereof is efficient in terms of time, cost, and quality. Bangladesh does
have laws to deal with different facets of black money, though some of
them were made reportedly in response to the pressure from donor
agencies. These laws are not perfect. However, the lack of political will,
the dearth of enforcement actions, the lack of impartiality, and the
deficiency in efficiency and honesty have overshadowed the legal
loopholes. This article identifies some of these weaknesses and
provides specific recommendations for improvement, having due
regard to the saying that “a stigma can never be a beauty spot.” These
recommendations aim to improve the regulatory regime in
Bangladesh in preventing black money and may also be suitable for
other countries facing similar issues.
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